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SEX, SHAME , AND THE L AW: AN E CONOMIC P ERSPECTIVE ON
MEGAN ’ S L AWS
*

DORON TEICHMAN

I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal system does not function in a vacuum. Different acts that are governed
by legal rules are also governed by social norms. These social norms are in many cases
enforced by a set of nonlegal sanctions, which include internal sanctions such as guilt,
and external sanctions such as refusals to interact with the offender. This article focuses
on the general question how should policymakers aiming to minimize the cost of
sanctioning utilize legal and nonlegal sanctions when designing a system of criminal
sanctions. More specifically, this article will analyze the current trend in different
jurisdictions in the United States to publicize the names of convicted sex offenders.
Social norms and nonlegal sanctions have been studied by law and economics
scholars for many years. Initially, this inquiry focused on the unique characteristics of
nonlegal systems within closely-knit societies and the possibilities of private ordering,1
and has broadened to issues related to public law. 2 More recently, this literature has
turned to develop more general theories as to the origin of social norms, 3 and the
relationship between social norms and the law. 4 The combined power of these studies
*
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1

See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD . 11
(1973); Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER W ITHOUT LAW (1991); Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and
Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 A MER. ECON. REV. 535 (1993);
Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Future Exchange, 98 M ICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21 J. LEGAL STUD . 115 (1992) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
M ICH. L. RE V. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Cotton Industry].
2

See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in
Cyberspace – Rights Without Laws? 73 CHI.-KENT L. RE V. 1155 (1998).
3

See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 M ICH. L. RE V. 338
(1997); Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 PA. U. L. RE V. 1643 (1996); Eric Posner, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000).
4

McAdams, id. at 391-432; Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1725-36 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996);
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demonstrates the seriousness with which law and economics scholars treat social norms
and nonlegal sanctions. 5
One of the current debates regarding nonlegal sanctions is to what extent should
legally induced nonlegal sanctions, such as sha ming, be used in order to punish criminals.
At one end of this debate, stand scholars such as Massaro and Whitman, who argue that
nonlegal sanctions are either ineffective or morally repugnant and therefore should not be
used. 6 At the other end of this debate, stand scholars such as Kahan and Eric Posner, who
argue that nonlegal sanctions may be an efficient and politically viable sanctioning tool.7
This Article sides with the later, yet turns to incorporate into this debate additional
economic insights. More specifically, it will demonstrate that policymakers cannot
substitute legal sanctions with nonlegal sanctions while holding the level of nonlegal
sanctions equal, since the level of each of these is expected to affect the other. For
example, a reduced legal sanction might cause the public to perceive a certain crime as
less severe, and cause a reduction in nonlegal sanctions. Thus, tailoring an efficient
regime that combines legal and nonlegal sanctions might be more difficult than
previously perceived.
A specific example that I will focus my attention on in this Article is the treatment
of sex offenders in the United States. Since the 1990s, every state in the country has
enacted some form of a Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law (SORNL).
These laws create a regime that disseminates to the public information about convicted
sex offenders, such as their name and home address. Generally, these laws were enacted
in order to assist the public to protect itself from the threat of repeat sex offenders.
Nevertheless, ever since their enactment, a large number of commentators have argued
that the true effect of these laws is punitive. 8 These scholars focused on the harsh
nonlegal sanctions triggered by these laws, which include, among other things, physical
attacks on offenders and their property, denial of housing, and termination of
employment. Building on the theoretical framework developed in this Article, I will
argue that the actual effects of SORNLs are punitive and thus they should be viewed as a
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); and Robert
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 585 (1998).
5

An overview of the economic analysis of social norms can be found in Eric Posner's study of the issue.
See Posner, supra note 3.
6

Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 M ICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); James Q.
Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? , 107 YALE L. J. 1055 (1998).
7

Dan Kahan , What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Dan Kahan & Eric
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminal: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
J. L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
8

See, e.g., Caroline Lousie Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due
Process, 31 HARV. C.R. – C.L. L. REV. 89 (1996); Jane A. Small, Who are the People in your
Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1451 (1999)

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

3

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 26 [2004]
SEX, SHAME , AND THE LAW

3

form of punishment. The second claim I will make is that using SORNLs in order to
punish sex offenders might be an efficient way to sanction sex offenders. Adopting the
punitive approach towards SORNLs will, however, require a change of attitude towards
these laws.
This article is organized as follows: Section II makes the general case for the use
of nonlegal sanctions as a punitive tool. It points out the potential efficiencies and
inefficiencies of using legal and nonlegal sanctions and presents the potential interactions
between the two. Section III turns to the specific case study of sanctioning sex offenders,
and will analyze the social phenomena triggered by SORNLs from an economic
perspective. In Section IV I will build on my findings regarding the actual effects of
SORNLs to make several policy recommendations. Finally, Section V makes some
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

II.

NONLEGAL SANCTIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONING
TECHNOLOGY

In this Section I will set out the case for the use of nonlegal sanctions as an
alternative to costly legal sanctions. I will begin by defining what the nonlegal sanctions I
am referring to are, and by exploring some of the forces that explain their existence.
Then, I will present the economic case for the use of legally induced nonlegal sanctions,
and argue that the arguments made against the use of these sanctions, while important, do
not justify forgoing their use. At that point, I will turn to develop a model of combining
legal and nonlegal sanctions. The distinguishing factor of this model, when compared to
existing models, is that it incorporates the potential effects of changes in the level of legal
sanctions on the level of nonlegal sanctions. Finally, I will demonstrate how nonlegal
sanctions can affect the level of legal sanctions through the sentencing and plea
bargaining processes. Proofs of the claims made in this Section are provided in the
Appendix.
1. A Theory of Nonlegal Sanctions
In recent years courts and legislatures have turned to inducing nonlegal sanctions
as an alternative to imprisonment. The names of patrons of prostitutes are published in
newspapers. 9 Individuals convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol are required
to use special license plates or bumper stickers. 10 Offenders are ordered to wear t-shirts
that announce their crimes. 11 Courts instruct offenders to appear in public and describe
the crimes they were convicted of and apologize for them. 12 These measures sanction
9

See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex In the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and
Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1996);
Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 735 n12 (1998).
10

See Note, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation that Failed, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988).

11

Kahan, supra note 7 at 632 and references made there.

12

Id. at 633 and references made there; Massaro, supra note 6 at 1888-9.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art26

4

Teichman:

4

SEX, SHAME , AND THE LAW

wrongdoers by disseminating information about their past criminal activity. This
dissemination is expected to have two distinct adverse effects on the sanctioned
individuals. First, it will cause them negative feelings ranging from mild embarrassment
to severe shame. 13 This is the internal aspect of nonlegal sanctions. Second, it might
trigger sanctions that are inflicted to the criminal by other members of the community,
such as cutting off relationships, termination of employment, and even violent retaliation.
This is the external aspect of nonlegal sanctions.
The fact that humans feel discomfort when wrongful acts they committed are
revealed to the public is intuitive, and requires little explaining. Yet the tendency of
individuals to sanction wrongdoers does require some explaining, since inflicting
sanctions is costly, 14 while the benefits created by sanctions, such as deterrence, are
enjoyed by the general public. 15 Therefore, individuals will apply a sanction to other
individuals only when the personal benefits they gain from applying the sanction exceed
the cost of applying the sanction. 16
The cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions depends on the kind of sanction. In the
context of passive sanctions, such as cutting off the relationship with the wrongdoer, the
cost is the forgone opportunity of interacting with the wrongdoer. 17 Once we move into
more active sanctions, such as shaming, the costs of sanctioning become more explicit
and include, for example, the time and mental resources that are put into sanctioning, and
the risk that the sanctioned party will choose to retaliate. More extreme sanctions, such as
the use of violence, might generate an additional cost in the form of potential legal
liability.

13

For an analytical discussion of the distinction among these different feelings see, e.g., June Price
Tangney et. al, Are Shame, Guilt and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 1256 (1996). Although many pages of psychological journals have been dedicated to this
distinction it is of little consequence to the discussion here. My focus is on causing disutility to wrongdoers
and the specific psychological definition of this disutility will not affect the results of the discussion.
14

See Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE , 211 (1981) (pointing out that in the absence of
compensation an individual must derive utility from a vengeful act in order to be motivated to commit it). It
should be noted that some scholars that dealt with the question of the creation of nonlegal sanctions have
argued that nonlegal sanctions are created on the basis of a costless mechanism. See Richard H. McAdams,
supra note 3 at 355. In his analysis McAdams focuses on withholding esteem as a costless basis on which
nonlegal sanctions are build. Yet since even withholding esteem requires some action on part of the
individuals that are doing the withholding it would seem that such a sanction does require the individuals
who inflict it to bear at least some costs. Hence, we cannot resolve the cost benefit analysis by assuming
that there is no cost.
15

See McAdams, id. at 352-53.

16

As we shall see this benefit can also be in the form of avoiding a harm that will be inflicted on the
individual if he does not participate in the act of sanctioning.
17

To be sure, the termination of long-term relationship might cause the parties significant monetary costs,
the most obvious example being divorce.
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Turning to the reasons for sanctioning, individuals who inflict nonlegal sanctions
incur several distinct benefits. The first is the fulfillment of a preference for
sanctioning. 18 More specifically, I am referring to the existence of a preference for
reciprocity. 19 The preference for reciprocity has been demonstrated in a long line of
experiments of ultimatum games, in which participants willingly endured monetary costs
in order to sanction individuals who treated them in a way that they perceived to be
unfair. 20 The presence of a preference for reciprocity can be explained by evolutionary
models that illustrate why mutants that have a preference for reciprocity have higher
reproductive success, 21 and by game theory models suggesting that players can maximize
their personal payoffs in repeated games by adopting a strategy based on reciprocity. 22 To
be sure, the preference for reciprocity is not limited to the direct victim of the wrongful
act. Rather, concrete examples of nonlegal sanctions 23 and stylised experiments 24

18

Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002) (presenting data
supporting the hypothesis that emotions are an important factor behind the act of punishing others).
19

For a review of the economics of reciprocity see generally Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological
Foundations of Incentives, 46 EURO. ECON. REV. 687, 689-704 (2002).
20

The first experiments evaluating behavior in ultimatum games were reported in Werner Guth, Rolf
Schmittbeger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 367 (1982). For an updated review of ultimatum game studies see generally Werner Guth, On
Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 329 (1995); Richard
H. Thaler, THE W INNER’S CURSE 21-35 (1992).
21

Werner Guth & Menahem E. Yaari, Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An
Evolutionary Approach, in: EXPLAINING PROCESS AND CHANGE – A PPROACHES TO EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS 23 (Ulrich Witt ed., 1992); Steffen Huck & Jorg Oechssler, The Indirect Evolutionary
Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations, 28 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 13 (1999).
22

Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (showing how a reciprocal strategy can
lead to higher payoffs for a player in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma).
23

Consumer boycotts, at times, serve the purpose of expressing disapproval of wrongful acts that harm
others. See: Monroe Friedman, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS 12-13 (1999). An historical example of such an
expressive nonlegal sanction is the Jewish boycott against German goods during World War II. The goal of
participating in this boycott was to allow American Jews to take some action, futile as it might be, rather
than do nothing. See: William Orbach, Shattering the Shackles of Powerlessness: The Debate Surrounding
the Anti-Nazi Boycott of 1933-41, 2 MODERN JUDAISM 149, 161-66 (1982)). Nevertheless it should be
noted that participation in this boycott was driven by other forces as well (see infra note 25).
24

Daniel Kahenman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard L. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59
J. OF BUSINESS, S285, S290-S292 (1986). In the first stage of this experiment participants plaid a variation
of the ultimatum game in which the alocator needed to divide between hims elf and a recipient $20. The
alocator was able to divide the $20 either equally or by allocating $18 to himself and allocating $2 to the
recipient. In the second stage of the game participants were asked to choose between receiving a payoff of
$12 that was to be shared equally with a player that chose to allocate $18 to himself in the first round and
receiving a payoff of $10 that was to be shared equally with a player that chose to allocate $10 to himself in
the first round. Thus, the players in the second round were asked to give up one dollar in order to sanction a
player that acted unfairly in the first round towards another individual. The results of the experiment were
clear - 74% of the players in the second round chose to sacrifice their monetary well being in order to
sanction individuals that treated other players unfairly. See also Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher & Simon
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demonstrate that individuals also hold a preference for sanctioning individuals who
treated other members of society unfairly.
A second benefit of nonlegal sanctions is that participating in acts of sanctioning
can induce positive reactions from others and vice- versa – not participating in acts of
sanctioning may trigger negative reactions from others. In other words, in some situations
there exists a social norm, which is enforced by a separate set of nonlegal sanctions, that
requires one to sanction wrongdoers. For instance, individuals who refuse to participate
in a consumer boycott might be sanctioned for their refusal. 25 The existence of a
sanctioning norm can be explained by the signaling model of social norms. 26 In this
model, individuals are either “co-operators” who care about future payoffs (have a low
discount rate), or “cheaters” who care about present payoffs (have a high discount rate).
Both types of players are situated in a repeated game in which co-operators maximize
their payoffs by interacting among themselves. In order to achieve this goal, co-operators
can use costly signals that only individuals who expect the high cooperative payoff can
afford to send. 27 Within this framework the cost incurred by the sanctioning party is
Gächter, Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms, 13 HUM. NATURE
- A N INTERDISC . BIOSOCIAL PERSP . 1, 16-17 (2002).
25

See Sankar Sen, Zeynep Gurhan-Canli & Vicki Morwitz, Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma
Perspective on Consumer Boycotts, 28 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 399, 401 (pointing out the connection
between consumer boycotts and group membership); Dennis E. Garrett, Consumer Boycotts: Are Targets
Always the Bad Guys, 58 BUS. & SOC. RE V. 17, 19-21 (1986) (pointing out the moral problems associated
with consumer boycotts). For specific examples See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 23 at 136 (describing how
the Jewish boycott against German goods during World War II was rigorously enforced by nonlegal
sanctions); W. Muraskin, The Harlem Boycott of 1934: Black Nationalism and the Rise of Labor-Union
Consciousness, 13 LABOR HISTORY 361, 364 (1972) (presenting a case in which the photographs of boycott
violators were published in a local newspaper).
26

The relation between signaling and social norms has been extensively examined and thus I will explain
the nature of the signaling mo del in the text above only briefly. For further analysis see Eric A. Posner,
Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 765 (1998) [hereinafter:
Posner, Symbols], and Posner, supra note 3 at 11-35. It should be noted that the signaling model of social
norms is not the exclusive explanation for the existence of a sanctioning norm. Recently, Mahoney and
Sanchirico presented a game theoretic analysis of strategies in a repeated prisoners dilemma, which offered
an alternative explanation for the existence of a sanctioning norm. In their paper Mahoney and Sanchirico
introduce a game strategy – def-for-dev (defect-for deviate), which has the practical effect of requiring from
parties to sanction defectors, and views those who do not do so as deviators that should be sanctioned.
Thus, according to this model, if individuals do not have exceptionally high discount rates they will
participate in the act of sanctioning in accordance with the social norm requiring them to do so. See Paul G.
Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
SCHOOL OF LAW 2002 LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, W ORKING PAPER NO. 02-3 (2002) at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=311879.
27

To illustrate this description it might be useful to view the numerical example presented in Posner,
Symbols, id. at 769-70. In this example the world is divided to “senders” and “receivers” that can interact
among themselves. Both senders and receivers are composed out of “co-operators” and “cheaters”. In the
game a cooperating receiver needs to decide whether to deal with a sender. The players in Posner’s
cooperation game face the following payoffs: If the receiver does not cooperate with the sender the payoff
for the sender and the receiver is $0. If the receiver cooperates and the sender is a cheater the sender will
cheat and gain $2 while the receiver will lose $2. Finally, if the receiver will cooperate and the sender is a

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

7

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 26 [2004]
SEX, SHAME , AND THE LAW

7

precisely what makes the infliction of the nonlegal sanction a credible signal. Individuals
who do not participate in the act of sanctioning are perceived as non-co-operators, and
find it difficult to interact with members of the sanctioning group. Furthermore, since
nonlegal sanctions have content, in the sense that they express disapproval of the
wrongful act, they might have a cost structure in which signaling is more costly for
cheaters. Such a cost structure will render superior signals since it will reduce the amount
of resources spent on signaling. 28
The last force that might bring people to change the ir attitude towards wrongdoers
for the worse is the discovery that the wrongdoer is a type of person who tend s to commit
wrongful acts. This will be the case if past wrongful acts can serve as a proxy for future
wrongful acts. Thus, quite naturally, once members of society learn of the specific risks
associated with dealing with the wrongdoer, they will internalise this new information
into the decision of how to interact with him in the future. For example, once it is
discovered that a business partner has a higher probability of breach than was previously
perceived in the marketplace, the value of the contracts offered by this individual will
diminish, and from his perspective he will suffer from a nonlegal sanction.
Having identified the three forces driving the creation of nonlegal sanctions,
namely, preferences, sanctioning norms, and prevention, I can now introduce an
analytical distinction between the different types of nonlegal sanctions. The term
nonlegal sanctions is broad and includes any reduction in the welfare of the wrongdoer as
result of the discovery that he committed the wrongful act. The term punishment, on the
other hand, is narrower and only refers to the reduction in the welfare of the wrongdoer
that is associated with achieving a norma tive goal such as retribution or deterrence. 29
Viewed from this perspective, the first two categories of nonlegal sanctions should be
viewed as a form of punishment since they inflict suffering to wrongdoers on account of
their past behavior and by doing so they fulfil a societal need for retribution and
deterrence. Preventative nonlegal sanctions, however, should not be viewed as a form of
punishment. From a reciprocal perspective, such sanctions do not balance past accounts
but rather reflect a forward looking decision. From a deterrence perspective, in many

co-operator they will both gain a payoff of $6. Posner further assumes that there is some random act, say,
saluting the flag, which costs both parties $3 and that receivers believe that indicates cooperation. Under
these assumptions a separating equilibrium may emerge in which the receiver will cooperate with players
who salutes the flag, and will refuse to deal with players who do not salute the flag. Under such a strategy
cheaters will not be able to deal with the co-operator since their payoff of $2 is insufficient to cover the cost
of the signal, and they will prefer not to deal and gain $0 rather than signal and remain with a net payoff of
$-1. On the other hand co-operators that earn $6 can afford to send a signal at the cost of $3.
28
In the terms of the numerical example presented in the previous note assume that the cost of the signal is
still $3 for cheaters but only $1 for co-operators. Such a signal is superior since it allows the creation of a
separating equilibrium at a lower cost.
29

In addition, as a practical matter there might be a minimal threshold of welfare loss that is required in
order to enter the realm of punishment. Given the legal implications of the definition of punishment such a
threshold might be useful in order to prevent litigation surrounding policies that while analytically might be
viewed as a punishment do not create a significant burden on the lives of wrongdoers.
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cases these sanctions reflect future harms that the wrongdoer might cause, and therefore
should not be viewed as part of his punishment. 30
2. Nonlegal Sanctions as a Substitute for Costly Legal Sanctions
At the outset of presenting my argument a clarifying comment as to the scope of
this project should be made. This Article deals exclusively with the question how should
sanctions be inflicted and not why they should be inflicted. It is at this point, that
economic analysis can make a separate contribution, and point the most efficient
sanctioning techniques given any exogenous political decision as to the size of the
required sanction. Thus, one might hold a retributionist view towards the goal criminal
sanctions and agree with the analysis presented here.
From an economic perspective the basic argument underlying the shift to nonlegal
sanctions is the proposition that policymakers should use the most cost effective form of
punishment. 31 For instance, econo mists have been arguing for a long time that
policymakers should use fines, which are a cheap punishment, rather than costly nonmonetary sanctions such as imprisonment. 32 Similarly, if one can inflict the same amount
of pain to the sanctioned individual through imprisonment or through a nonlegal sanction,
one should choose to use the sanctioning technology that is cheaper to administer. 33 In
fact, budget crises around the nation have led states and counties to realize that they
simply cannot afford to continue using imprisonment at the levels they have grown
accustomed to. 34
30

For example, after a wrongdoer caused an accident by driving recklessly his insurance premiums might
rise. This rise is similar to preventative nonlegal sanctions since it reflects the insurance company
reassessing its contractual relationship with the wrongdoer given the new information about the wrongdoer.
Yet notice that the rise in premiums reflects precisely (in a competitive insurance market) the rise in
expected losses of the wrongdoer. Thus, this additional sanction, while painful from the perspective of the
wrongdoer, should not affect the calculation of the optimal sanction.
31
See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1236 (1985) (defining the social welfare problem). For an alternative view on
shaming sanctions see generally Garvey, supra note 9 (presenting an educating model of shaming).
32

See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193-98
(1968) (arguing that fines should be used whenever feasible); Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for
White Collar Criminals, 17 A M. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) (arguing that white collar criminals should
be sanctioned by fines rather than by imprisonment); Shavell, id. at 1236-1241 (arguing that nonmonetary
sanctions should be used only after a fine equaling the offender’s wealth has been used).
33

See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 7 at 367-8 (arguing that “shaming could prove to be an efficient
alternative to prison for white-collar offenders”); Garvey, supra note 9 at 738 (noting that “at a time when
the costs of imprisonment consume ever larger shares of state budgets, shame may serve as a politically
viable and cost effective way of achieving deterrence, specific and general, as well as of satisfying the
legitimate demands of retribution”). Even scholars who raise fierce opposition to the use of shame
punishments concede the fact that these sanctions are cheaper than imprisonment. See Toni M. Massaro,
Meanings of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, P SYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 649 (1997) (noting
that shaming “is plainly cheaper than imprisonment”).
34

See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J. Schodolski, Strapped States Turn to Prisons Early Releases
Among Saving Options, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2003, at 8 (reporting that inmates in Los Angeles county were
released from jail in order to save $17 million); Scott Kraus, 100 Inmates Granted Early Release.
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In order to analyze the optimal use of legal and nonlegal sanctions one must have
an understanding of the costs of using them. In this Article I assume that the cost of
producing both legal and nonlegal sanctions is marginally increasing. In other words,
each additional unit of disutility inflicted to offenders will be more costly than the
previous unit using one of the two sanctioning technologies. This assumption is quite
standard in economic analysis, and is synonymous with social rationality.
More specifically, this assumption is realistic with respect to legal sanctions since
when viewing these sanctions we can see how they progress in a manner that reflects
increasing marginal costs. Minor criminal activity is in many cases sanctioned by the
imposition of fines, which are a socially cheap (if not costless) sanction. More severe
crimes are in many cases sanctioned by the imposition of parole and community service,
which are more costly. It is only after these cheaper sanctioning modes fail, that
governments generally turn to costlier methods of sanctioning, such as imprisonment.
Similarly, inflicting and inducing nonlegal sanctions reflect a picture of
marginally increasing costs. With respect to the former, Ellickson’s description of the
scale of nonlegal sanctions used in Shasta County might serve as a useful illustration.
This scale includes nonlegal sanctions that rise from negative gossip, through threats of
violence, and end up in the use of actual violence. 35 Arguably, the costs of the sanctions
on this scale are marginally increasing. As to the later, first one should notice that despite
the fact that one might think that nonlegal sanctions come at no cost to governments,
inducing nonlegal sanctions does create costs. In the context of SORNLs, for example,
these costs include the costs of setting up notification websites, updating these websites,
tracking down offenders, and actively notifying communities. 36 In fact, the current budget
crisis in many states has caused some of them to limit the resource they expend on such
projects. 37 As to the way states structure the costs of inducing nonlegal sanctions, one can
Northampton County Says Crowding, Budget Cuts Led to Move, A LLENTOWN MORNING CALL, April 12,
2003, at B1 (reporting that 100 inmates in Northampton County were released due to budget constraints);
Mark R. Chellgren, Kentucky to Release Felons Early Move to Help Corrections Department Balance
Budget, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS , Dec. 18, 2002, at B12 (reporting that Kentucky Governor, Paul
Patton, decided to release over 550 prison inmates due to the states budget crisis). It should be noted that
the Kentucky program, which was probably the most publicized one in the nation, was eventually
abandoned after two released inmates were arrested and charged with bank robbery and rape. See AP,
Patton to End Early Release Program, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Feb. 1, 2003, at B3.
35
Ellickson, supra note 1 at 56-9.
36

See, e.g., Carol L. Kunz, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual Offenders, 47 A M. U. L.
REV. 453, 480-1 (1997) (assessing the costs of SORNLs); Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender
Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-3 (1994) (pointing
out problems of implementing SORNLs associated with their costs); Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community
Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from “Megan’s Law”, 33 ST . M ARY’S L. J. 101, 117
(reporting that in Dallas, Texas, more than one hundred officers had spent four days verifying sex
offender’s addresses).
37

See, e.g., Scott Milfred, Jobs that Deal With Sex Offenders Cut; The State Department of Corrections has
Eliminated the Positions to Save Money, THE CAPITAL TIMES & WIS. ST . J., July 13, 2003 at A1 (describing
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again see a scale ranging from low cost shaming using bumper stickers and distribution
of flyers, to costly measures such as personal notification conducted by officers to every
household in a certain area. 38
Having set out my assumption as to the cost of sanctioning, I can now turn to state
the condition for using legal and nonlegal sanctions efficiently. Generally, the cost of
sanctioning will be minimized when the marginal cost of inflicting legal sanctions equals
the marginal cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions. To understand why, consider the
decision of a policymaker who is trying to achieve a given total sanction. Suppose that
initially the policymaker uses only legal sanctions. If the “last” – marginal – unit of the
legal sanction is very costly, the policymaker can reduce the total cost of sanctioning by
replacing this unit with one equivalent unit of nonlegal sanction, and choose the type of
nonlegal sanction that is least expensive. The policymaker can continue to reduce the
total cost of sanctioning by substituting more units of legal sanctions with units of
nonlegal sanctions. As the policymaker continues substituting in this manner, the cost
saving will gradually diminish, since the marginal cost of legal sanctions will gradually
fall and the marginal cost of nonlegal sanctions will gradually rise. Once the policymaker
reaches the point in which the marginal costs of legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal,
additional substitutions will only raise the total cost of sanctioning, since the marginal
cost of nonlegal sanctions will exceed the marginal cost of legal sanctions. Hence, this
point reflects the point in which the costs of sanctioning are minimized. 39
job cuts in the Wisconsin program due to budget constraints); Denisue M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson,
Continuing Debate Over Megan’s Law. Some Question whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime. The State
Statute is Set to Expire Next Year, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003 at B2 (California Attorney General pointing
out that verifying registration would cost the state $15 million to $20 million which is a “hefty request”
given the California budget deficit); Dayton Kevin, Budget Scenarios Criticized, HONOLULU A DVERTISER,
Feb. 26, 2002, at A1 (noting that the Hawaiian attorney general was considering to eliminate the states sex
offender registration program due to budget cuts); Kirk Mitchell, Bill Revamps Sex-Offender List CBI
would be in Charge of Tracking System, DENV. POST , Jan. 25, 2002, at B1 (reporting that many police
departments do not check the addresses of sex offenders due to staffing concerns).
38

To be sure, nonlegal sanctions are unique in the sense that by using them the government can externalize
some of the costs of sanctioning to the public and thus raise the amount of sanctions being inflicted given a
governmental budget constraint. This is true both from the perspective of the costs of applying the nonlegal
sanctions themselves, which, quite obviously, are born by the sanctioning public, but it is also true with
respect to the cost of inducing nonlegal sanctions. For example, in the context of SORNLs some states have
attempted to externalize the cost of notification to sex offenders. See I.C. § 18-8324 (7) (offender required
to pay for news paper ads); IOWA CODE §692A.6.1 (offender required to pay registration fee); LA. REV.
STAT . §15:542 D (same). It should be noted that in Louisiana the state has also imposed the responsibility
(and costs) of notification on the offenders themselves, see LA. RE V. STAT . §15:542 B(1). From an
economic perspective all of these costs are part of the social costs of sanctioning and should be accounted
for while developing a theory of efficient sanctioning.
39

To be sure, the problem of minimizing the cost of sanctioning could lead to corner solutions in which the
optimal result is to use only one of the two sanctioning technologies. This will occur when one of the
technologies has a positive set up cost (i.e. its marginal cost at the zero sanction point is positive) that is
higher than the marginal cost of the alternative technology when it is the sole producer of sanctions. For the
duration of this Article I will only deal with those situations in which a positive amount of both types of
sanctions should be used.
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A simple numerical example might clarify the argument. Assume that the required
sanction to a type of criminals is 1,000. 40 In table 1 I present a possible cost structure of
inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions to such criminals. The first column represents
increasing levels of legal sanction units with their corresponding cost (C(LS)). Column
three represents amounts of nonlegal sanctions that combine for a total sanction of 1,000,
and column four represents their corresponding cost (C(NLS)). 41 Finally, the fifth column
represents the total cost of sanctioning (C(TS)).
Legal
Sanction

C(LS)

Nonlegal
Sanction

C(NLS)

C(TS)

500

100

500

81

181

600

110

400

68

178

700

124

300

58

182

Table 1: The Benchmark Case

When viewing table 1 it becomes apparent that the regime that minimizes the cost of
sanctioning is the one in which we combine a legal sanction of 600 and a nonlegal
sanction of 400. If a policymaker will choose to deviate from that combination by
substituting 100 units of legal sanctions with 100 units of nonlegal sanctions, she will
save the marginal cost of inflicting legal sanctions - 10 - yet will have to spend an
additional 13 on nonlegal sanctions for a net loss of 3. If, on the other hand, she will
choose to deviate by substituting 100 units of nonlegal sanctions with 100 units of legal
sanctions, she will save the marginal cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions - 10 - yet will
have to spend an addit ional 14 on legal sanctions for a net loss of 4. Thus, we can see that
the cost minimizing combination is the one in which the marginal costs of legal and
nonlegal sanctions are equal.
In sum, from an economic perspective combining legal and nonlegal sanctions is
desirable since it can sustain a required level of punishment while creating a social
surplus. Yet despite this argument several commentators have raised opposition to such a
policy. Massaro, in an influential article laid out the argument that shaming sanctions
simply do not work as means to deter crime in modern urbanized societies. 42 According
40

All the figures in this example and the examples to come reflect measured “disutility units”. I am aware
of the potential criticism that such units do not exist and that measuring disutility is a difficult task.
Nonetheless, this real-world difficulty should not be overstated. Courts and legislatures deal on a daily
basis with issues that involve great measurement problems and there is no reason to assume that the case of
nonlegal sanctions is unique from that perspective.
41

Note that the costs of both types of sanctions in the example fulfill the marginally increasing assumption
meaning that each additional 100 units of either type of sanction units are more costly than the previous
100 units.
42

See Massaro, supra note 6 at 1921 (arguing that "[t]he cultural conditions of effective shaming seem
weakly present, at best, in many contemporary American cities"). See also Norval Morris & Michael
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to this argument shaming sanctions might have been useful historically within closelyknit communities, but in modern urban society where people do not know each other and
do not care about the way others perceive them, shaming will not work. It would seem,
however, that this argument overstates the weakness of shaming sanctions. True, modern
society is not as closely knit as traditional societies. It is larger, members hold less
information about each other, and the prospect of repeat dealings with random members
of the community is quite low. Yet people in modern society continue to live within subcommunities that do hold the characteristics of closely-knit communities. Family,
neighbors, and work associates are examples of such sub-communities. 43 Thus, although
one might be indifferent whether a stranger on the street is aware of the fact he used the
services of a prostitute, one would not want his family members and coworkers to find
out about this behavior. 44
A related argument made against the use of shaming sanctions is that in a diverse
society, such as modern America, different groups of society are bound to have different
values, and these will lead to different attitudes towards what constitutes a shameful act. 45
Thus, so the argument goes, while shaming sanctions can be effective in cohesive groups,
they will not be effective in contemporary America where there is no social consensus as
to what a shameful act is. 46 Furthermore, given these differences among groups, there
might also be inconsistencies as to what causes people shame. 47 For instance, while
members of one group might find cleaning the streets in a unique outfit to be degrading,
others might see nothing of it. Yet, again, it would seem that this argument overstates the
Torny, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENT IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING
SYSTEM 5 (1990) (arguing that sanctions based only on stigma “seem more romantic than real in the urban
agglomerations where crime flourishes”).
43

An extensive literature has been to devoted to the importance of nonlegal sanctions in the context of
commercial transactions in modern America. The initial contribution in this context should be attributed to
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 A M. SOC. REV. 55
(1963). For more contemporary studies that dealing with this issue see, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990); Bernstein, Diamond Industry,
supra note 1; Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 1.
44

To be sure, one cannot argue that the nonlegal sanctions that individual face in a modern urban setting
are just as severe as those in traditional closely-knit societies. Some anecdotal evidence does in fact point
out that sex offenders are moving to urban areas since the harassment they face in those areas is smaller.
For example, in Minnesota a disproportionably high number of offenders moved to Minneapolis, which led
representatives of the city to try to reshape the local SORNL in a way that will force sex offenders out of
the city. See Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 W M. M ITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1309-11 (2003). Similar
concerns were raised in New York City. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Case
Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L. RE V. 315, 345 (2001). The point that is made in the text above is
that in modern urban settings wrongdoers will still face some nonlegal sanctions.
45

See Massaro, supra note 6 at 1922-23.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 1923-24.
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problems of shaming. Even in a diverse culture such as modern America there continues
to exist some consensus as to acts that are shameful. As we shall see in more detail
bellow, sex offenses are such an area.
In addition, it has been suggested that criminals, by their very nature, are less
susceptible to shame and therefore it is counterproductive to shame them. 48 This
argument seems to overstate the weakness of shame based sanctions for two reasons.
First, it is not clear what the empirical basis for such a claim is. Second, accepting the
premise of the claim, one should still note that it focuses on the internal aspects of
shaming sanctions, while neglecting their external aspects. Even the shameless will want
to avoid losing central elements of their lives such as family, close friends, employment
and housing.
A separate argument made by Whitman focuses on the adverse effects of shaming
sanctions on the sanctioning crowd. 49 More specifically, Whitman is concerned that the
delegation of the act of punishing to the public could stir up public emotions, and create
an atmosphere of lynch justice. 50 Yet again, it is not clear that this concern represents a
reason to completely abandon shame sanctions. Instead, policymakers should be aware of
the possibility that such sanctions will get out of hand and take measures to prevent this
from happening. 51 Prosecution of vigilantes, policing of demonstrations against
offenders, and harm caused to innocent bystanders, are all costs associated directly with
shame sanctions that must be incorporated into the cost-benefit calculus.
An additional problem associated with nonlegal sanctions is that they rely on local
communities and their sanctioning norms, rather than on a central government, to punish
criminals. Local norms might serve the narrow interests of the community creating them,
while being inefficient from a broader social perspective. 52 For example, communities
might choose to punish criminals by banishing them. 53 Such sanctions are potentially
inefficient since they create a negative externality, namely, the fact that the criminal will

48

Id. at 1918 (“the people most likely to respond to public shaming sanctions are nonoffender members of
the audience, not potential offenders”).
49
Whitman, supra note 6 at 1087-92.
50

Id.

51

Historically, regimes that used shame sanctions were aware of this problem and devoted resources to
control the behavior of the sanctioning public. For example, in England during the times when the pillory
was used, constables made sure that the event would not deteriorate to wild violence. See J. M. Beattie
CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, 614-16 (1986).
52

See Posner, supra note 4 at 1720-1 (analyzing the potential inefficiencies of norms that generate negative
externalities).
53

This seems to be the current case with respect to sex offenders. See, e.g., Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex
Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL L. REV. 885, 908 (1995) (noting that “sometimes the
community outrage and rejection forces the offender out of town”). For a review of the nonlegal sanctions
suffered by offenders see infra Section III 3.
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end up in a neighboring community. 54 This again points out that a regime based on
nonlegal sanctions will have to expend resources on regulating nonlegal sanctions. For
instance, certain sanctions such as housing discrimination might be found to be
inefficient since their main goal is to generate negative externalities, and therefore will
need to be outlawed. 55
Another notable argument raised against nonlegal sanctions is that stigmatizing
individuals might drive these individuals to commit additional crimes. 56 This argument
relies on the insight of criminologists that labeling individuals as deviants might cause
them to drift away from society into a life within criminal subcultures or a life of solitary
deviance. 57 Alternatively, this argument can build upon recent studies in social
psychology that demonstrate the self- fulfilling aspects of stereotypes and stigmas. 58
According to these studies stereotypes might create a psychological burden that will

54

See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional
Competition (2004).
55

See, e.g., N.J. STAT . § 2C:7-16 5. c. (prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of registration as a
sex offender).
56

Persons, supra note 9 at 1544-45 (pointing out the specific deterrence problems associated with
publishing the names of patrons of prostitutes).
57
See generally Frank Tannenbaum, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY (1938); W. B. Miller, Lower-Class
Culture as a Generating Mileu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 5 (1958) K. T. Erikson, Notes on
the Sociology of Deviance, 9 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 307 (1962); Howard S. Becker, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963).
58

The initial contribution in this context should be attributed to Steele and Aronson who demonstrated that
making African Americans vulnerable to a negative stereotype as to their group’s intellectual abilities
caused them to perform significantly worse then Whites in a standardized test. See Claude M. Steele &
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. P SYCH. 797 (1995). Ever since this study was reported its results were duplicated in
numerous studies in different contexts. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes
Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 A MER. PSYCH. 613 (1997) (reporting on the effects of
stereotypes with respect to female performance in standardized math tests); Clarck McKnown & Rhona S.
Weinstein, The Development and Consequences of Stereotype Consciousness in Middle Childhood, 74
CHILD DEV. 498, 506-10 (2003) (reporting an experiment that demonstrated that once children become
aware of commonly held stereotypes their cognitive performance is adversely affected); Mara Cadinu et. al,
Stereotype Threat: The Effect of Expectancy on Performance, 33 EURO. J. SOC. P SYCH. 267 (2003)
(reporting on the effects of stereotypes with respect to women in math exams and African Americans in
verbal exams); J. C. Croizet & T. Claire, Extending the Concept of Stereotype Threat to Social Class: The
Intellectual Underperformance of Students from Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds, 24 PERSONALITY &
SOC. P SYCH. BULLT . 588 (1998) (showing that low socioeconomic status students under perform on a
verbal test if it is framed as a test of intelligence); Jacques-Philippe Leyens et. al, Stereotype Threat: Are
Lower Status and History of Stigmatization Preconditions of Stereotype Threat?, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULLT . 1189 (2000) (reporting the effects of stereotypes with respect to males in processing
affective information); Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic
Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1213 (1999) (showing that effects of stereotypes o Whites
with respect to athletic abilities). For a review of the literature see S. Christian Wheeler & Richard E. Petty,
The Effects of Stereotype Activation on Behavior: A Review of Possible Mechanisms, 127 P SYCH. BULLT .
797 (2001).
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adversely affect performance in situations subject to the stereotype, 59 or might decrease
ones expectations from himself, which in turn might cause actual lower performance. 60
In economic terms the concern over higher future crime rates among stigmatised
individuals can be tied to the concept of marginal deterrence. The theory of marginal
deterrence asserts that the law should refrain from inflicting too harsh of a penalty for one
crime since such sanctions will stand in the way of deterring additional crimes. 61 The
reason for that is that individuals penalized by the harsh sanction will face no effective
sanction for additional – marginal - crimes since they already face the extremely high
sanction associated with their first crime. For example, if the punishment for robbery
were death, then a robber might as well kill the victim since he would lose nothing from
doing so and would lower his probability of detection by eliminating a witness. 62
The potential threat of nonlegal sanctions is inherent to criminal sanctions even
without the use of shaming sanctions. 63 Thus, individuals with low social capital face a
low potential nonlegal sanction, and are more difficult to deter. Indeed, an abundance of
studies point out that such individuals tend to have higher crime rates. 64 Crimes are
committed in disproportionately high numbers by unmarried people, 65 individuals with
lower social statues (e.g. low socio-economic status, membership in an oppressed
minority group), 66 and people who have high residential mobility. 67 In addition,

59

Steele, id. at 616-7. This explanation has recently been confirmed by studies that quantified both the
psychological anxiety and physiological changes that stereotypes cause. See Steven J. Spencer, Claude M.
Steele & Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance, 35 J. EXP . SOC. PSYCH. 4,
14-21 (1999) (reporting findings that demonstrate that anxiety was related to test performance); Jim
Blascovich et al., African Americans and High Blood Pressure: The Role of Stereotype Threat, 12 P SYCH.
SCIENCE 225, 228 (2001) (finding that when African Americans were under stereotype threat the exhibited
higher blood pressure the European Americans while in the absence of stereotype threat the two groups
exhibited similar blood pressure levels).
60

See Charles Stagnor, Christine Carr & Lisa Kiang, Activating Stereotypes Undermines Task Performance
Expectations, 75 J. PERS. & SOC . P SYCH. 1191 (1998); Cadinu et al., supra note 58 at 269-270. But see
Leyens et. al, supra note 58 at 1197 (arguing that it is very unlikely that participants preformed less well
because they felt helpless and unmotivated).
61
See, e.g., George J Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
62

Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 222 (6th ed., 2003).

63

See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization
as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980) (presenting an empirical
measurement of the deterrence power of nonlegal sanctions).
64

For an analysis of the effects of creating social capital on the design of criminal sanctions for repeat
offenders see David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Sanctions for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L. J. 733, 774-5 (2001).
65

See, e.g., N. T. Wolfe, F.T. Cullen & J.B. Cullen, Describing the Female Offender: A Note on the
Demographics of Arrests, 12 J. Crim. Just. 483 (1984).
66

See John Braithwaite CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 48-49 (1989) and studies cited there.
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historical studies demonstrated that extreme nonlegal sanctions led individuals who were
subjected to them to a life of criminal activity. For instance, cheek branding, which was
used in eighteenth century England as a sanction, caused an unconcealable mark on the
body of criminals that deprived them of any opportunity to reintegrate into society, and
drove them into a life of habitual crime. 68 Thus, a sanctioning regime should avoid
extremely high nonlegal sanctions, since such sanctions might eliminate the deterrence
power of nonlegal sanctions with respect to future crimes. Rather, we should strive to
create a reintegrative shaming regime that is cha racterized by the reacceptance of
criminals into the community after they were shamed. 69
Finally, several commentators have argued that there is something morally wrong
with state sponsored shaming. 70 It would seem, however, that any such argument is
unconvincing once framed within a discussion of substituting imprisonment with
nonlegal sanctions. Prison is a degrading experience, and it is difficult to see the moral
argument that would defend the right of individuals to spend more time incarcerated. 71
Furthermore, this argument becomes even more difficult to defend if the regime adopted
would allow criminals to choose between the two forms of sanctioning, 72 since under
such a regime criminals will suffer from the lightest sanction from their perspective. 73
The use of nonlegal sanctions might, on the other hand, raise a different moral
concern. Arguably, nonlegal sanctions have a higher variance than legal sanctions. One
offender might be subjected to extraordinary harsh nonlegal sanctions, while another
offender, committing an identical crime, might suffer a mild nonlegal sanction. From an
economic perspective that focuses on the ex-ante perspective of sanctioning this is of no
67

Studies of the connection between population mobility and crime rates go as far back as the 1930s. See
E. S. Longmoor & E. F. Young, Ecological Interrelationships of Juvenile Delinquency, Dependency, and
population Movements: A Cartographic Analysis of Data from long Beach, California, 41 A MER. J. SOC.
598 (1936). For a more recent study see, e.g., R. D. Crutchfield, M. R. Geerken & W. R. Gove, Crime Rate
and Social Integration: The Impact of Metropolitan Mobility, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 467 (1982).
68

Posner, supra note 3 at 105-6.

69

See, Braithwaite, supra note 66 at 55. One should note that despite his call for reintegration the initial
premise presented by Braithwaite is that shame has an important role in deterring crime and sustaining a
free society. Id. at 55.
70
See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 6 at 1942-43; Whitman supra note 6 at 1090-91.
71

See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 9 at 760 (noting that “evaluating which is more ‘undignified’ – prison or
public shaming – will depend on the details”); Kahan, supra note 7 at 646 (arguing that “[h]owever cruel
shaming is, imprisonment is much worse. It expresses at least as much condemnation, and adds a grotesque
variety of indignities that shaming cannot hope to rival”).
72

This seems to be the current practice in some cases. See, e.g., Jay Mathews, Freedom Means Having to
Say You’re Sorry; Criminal Justice System Tries an 'Apology Ad' Program as an Alternative to Prison,
W ASH. POST , Nov. 9, 1986, at A3 (reporting a case in which the defendant was allowed to choose to
publish an apology in a local newspaper in lieu of jail time).
73

Kahan, supra note __ at 647 (noting “it is more than paradoxical – it is either confused or disingenuous –
to say that one of the reasons to disregards offenders’ preferences is to spare them fro m cruelty”).
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major consequence, as long as similar offenders face similar sanctions ex-ante. Yet if the
base for criminal sanctions is ex-post retribution the use of nonlegal sanctions does raise
a serious problem, since similarly situated criminals might suffer from different
sanctions. Thus, if nonlegal sanctions do have a higher variance, the argument presented
in this Article is more committed to the goal of deterrence than I previously
acknowledged.
In this subsection I presented the economic case for the use of nonlegal sanctions,
and demonstrated that while the arguments raised against the use of such sanctions do
point out some valid concerns, they do not represent a reason to forgo the use of these
sanctions. I now turn to present a model of shaming, which incorporates the effects of the
law on the shaming behavior of individuals.
3. An Endogenous Model of Shaming
My analysis, thus far, assumed that a policymaker could simply reduce legal
sanctions without affecting the level of nonlegal sanctions. 74 In this subsection, I will
relax this assumption and offer an endogenous model for the combined use of legal and
nonlegal sanctions. More precisely, I will argue that depending on the social context,
reducing legal sanctions might either lower or raise the level of nonlegal sanctions. Since
there is limited empirical data on evaluating this issue, I will present a tentative analysis
of both. 75
The signaling case - One plausible assumption as to the relation between legal and
nonlegal sanctions is that the demand for inflicting nonlegal sanctions falls as the level of
legal sanctions diminishes. The causal explanation for this assumption is that legal
sanctions may serve as a signal that a wrongdoer deserves to be subject to a nonlegal
sanction. 76 Thus, when courts lower the legal sanctions applied to a certain type of
offenders, society follows in the same footsteps and lowers the magnitude of nonlegal
sanctions (for the purposes of this Article I will refer to this effect as “the signaling
effect”). Some empirical support for the signaling effect can be found in Lott’s study of

74

Studies focusing on the economic analysis of nonlegal sanctions have generally overlooked the potential
effects of the law on nonlegal sanctions. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 7 (not evaluating the effects
of substituting legal sanctions with nonlegal sanctions); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts
Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD . 401 (2001) (not evaluating the effects of
deducting nonlegal sanctions from damages).
75

Given the limited data we currently hold on nonlegal sanctions it is not uncommon for scholars to reach
tentative conclusions in this field. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 7 at 607 (noting that “the existing gap in
empirical knowledge should not discourage informed speculation about how deep-seated public
sensibilities shape the opportunities for reform”); Massaro, supra note 6 at 1918 (noting that “[t]hese
conclusions are subject to an important caveat. No empirical work currently is available with which to test
the practical impact of shaming sanctions. What follow, therefore, are provisional hypotheses”).
76

See Braithwaite, supra note 66 at 181 (noting that “the levels of punishment the state provides for a
particular crime themselves give a message about how shameful that offense is”); Kahan, supra note 7 at
603 (presenting an endogenous analysis of the law and moral perceptions).
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nonlegal sanctions in the context of larceny and theft in which he found that longer prison
sentences are related to lower post conviction income (i.e. a higher nonlegal sanction). 77
Two claims can be made as to the efficient use of legal and nonlegal sanctions in
the signaling case. First, the cost of sanctioning in this case continues to be minimized at
the point in which the marginal cost of inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions is equal.
The intuition underlying this result follows from the intuition of the benchmark case. As
long as a policymaker is not at a point in which the marginal costs of the legal and
nonlegal sanctions are equal, she could always lower the cost of sanctioning by shifting
to the sanctioning technology with the lower marginal cost. Second, in the signa ling case
the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions will have a higher level of legal
sanctions when compared to the benchmark case. To understand why, consider again a
policymaker who is trying to achieve a given total sanction and only uses legal sanctions.
Just like in the benchmark case, she begins to gradually substitute legal with nonlegal
sanctions. Yet notice that in the signaling case each substitution has two effects. First, as
in the benchmark case, each substitution increases the amount of nonlegal sanctions used,
and shifts the policymaker to nonlegal sanctions with higher marginal costs. Second, each
substitution lowers the level of the legal sanction, which in the signaling case raises the
cost of nonlegal sanctions. In other words, in the signaling case each substitution will
cause a greater rise in the marginal cost of nonlegal sanctions. Thus, the policymaker will
reach the point in which the marginal costs of legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal after
substituting a lower amount of legal sanctions.
Again, a simple numerical example might be useful. The signaling effect can be
captured as a rise in the cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions when the legal sanction is
reduced. In table 2 I present a possible cost structure for such a case.
Legal
Sanction

C(LS)

Nonlegal
Sanction

C(NLS)

C(TS)

500

100

500

98

198

600

110

400

77

187

700

124

300

60

184

Table 2: The Signaling Case

As is evident from table 2, the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions in
this case is 700 and 300 respectfully, the combination in which the marginal cost of the
two is equal. Furthermore, table 2 demonstrates that the rise in the cost of nonlegal
77

See John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals too Heavily?, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583, 597
(1992). It should be noted that part of the decline in the income of individuals that serve prison sentences
could be explained by the fact that they lose part of their human capital during their stay in prison – a factor
that is irrelevant in the case of damages. Nevertheless, the data presented by Lott demonstrates that the
decline in the income of convicted individuals exceeds any potential loss due to the loss of human capital.
But see Nigel Walker & Catherine Marsh, Do Sentences Affect Public Disapproval?, 24 BRIT . J.
CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1984) (presenting data suggesting that in general sentencing has a limited effect on the
disapproval of a wrongful act).
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sanctions created by the signaling effect shifted the cost minimizing combination to one
in which a higher amount of legal sanctions should be utilized.
The substitution case – A second plausible assumption regarding the effect of the level of
legal sanctions on the level of nonlegal sanctions is that the demand for inflicting
nonlegal sanctions rises as the legal sanction diminishes. According to this assumption
individuals wish to see that offenders suffer from an “appropriate” sanction. 78 Put
differently, offenders have a debt that they need to repay to society, and this debt can be
discharged of by legal or nonlegal means. 79 Since legal sanctions and nonlegal sanctions
produce the same outcome – the infliction of harm to wrongdoers – these two may serve
as substitutes (for the purposes of this Article I will refer to this effect as “the substitution
effect”). 80 Empirical support for the substitution effect can be found in the crowding out
literature. For many years this literature has pointed out that organized regulatory and
market institutions might crowd out public motivation to create alternative social
mechanisms. 81 Recently, this literature has expanded to the field of sanctioning, and
78

It should be noted that this effect could bring about not only nonlegal sanctions, but also nonlegal
“remedies” to individuals who have been subjected to what their community perceives to be an excessive
legal sanctions. For example, Braithwaite reports that among doctors who were found liable in medical
malpractice suits ninety per cent had a negative effects on their practice and eight per cent reported an
improvement in business after the suit. This later figure is explained by the fact that fellow doctors who felt
sorry for the doctors sanctioned by the legal system wished to assist them. See Braithwaite, supra note 66 at
128 (citing a study conducted by Cressey).
79

In the context of the nonlegal sanctions being inflicted to sex offenders one can find arguments that
offenders have “paid their debt to society” and should not be subjected to further social sanctions. See, e.g.,
Logan, supra note 44 at 1292-3 (referring to comments made by Senator Thomas Neuville of Minnesota);
Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and
Community Notification Laws to Juveniles, 21 CAL. L. REV. 163, 175 (2003) (quoting comments made by
North Carolina Representative Watt); Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding, A Constitutional
Analysis of Community Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 DRAKE L. RE V. 635, 659
(1999) (noting that “once offenders are released, they have paid their debt to society and have the
constitutional right to re-integrate into society”).
80

There is a long line of literature that demonstrates that the law has evolved as a substitute for nonlegal
sanctions, specifically for revenge based nonlegal sanctions. Perhaps the most famous such claim can be
found in Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW , 1-38 (1881). In his first lecture on the law Holmes
argues that various forms of legal liability developed from the concept of revenge. For a more
contemporary analysis of this argument see Richard A. Posner, LAW AND LITERATURE , 49-60 (2nd ed.,
1998) (analysing the evolution from revenge to law). For a model of the development from a revenge based
society to a legalistic society see, e.g., Geoffrey MacCormack, Revenge and Compensation in Early Law,
21 A MER. J. COMP . L. 69, 74 (1973).
81

See, e.g., A. Ostman, External Control may Destroy the Commons, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 103 (1998)
(suggesting that external regulation of common pool resources could diminish the moral obligations of
individuals and undermine internal regulation); R. M. Titmus, THE GIFT OF RELATIONSHIP : FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (arguing that monetary payments to givers of blood could diminish the
amount of blood given voluntarily). Additional support for this effect can be found in Lott's study of
nonlegal sanctions that are applied to individuals convicted in drug related offenses. See John R. Lott, Jr.,
An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an
Individual’s Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 176 (1992). In this study Lott found that individuals with
longer prison sentences had higher post conviction income (i.e. a lower nonlegal sanctions), though these
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preliminary studies have demonstrated that the use of legal sanctions might crowd out
nonlegal sanctions. 82 For example, a study conducted in day-care centers in Israel found
that the introduction of a fine that was levied on parents who were late to pick up their
children caused a rise in the number of parents coming in late. 83 This data can be
interpreted as an indication that when legal sanctions, such as a fine, move in, nonlegal
sanctions, such as guilt and shame, are crowded out. Thus, parents who avoided being
late since they were unwilling to endure the nonlegal sanctions associated with being late,
were willing to endure the legal sanction that substituted the nonlegal sanction. 84
Two claims can be made as to the efficient use of legal and nonlegal sanctions in
the substitution case. First, as should be clear by this point, the cost of sanctioning in this
case is minimized at the point in which the marginal cost of inflicting legal and nonlegal
sanctions are equal. Second, in the substitution case the efficient combination of legal and
nonlegal sanctions will have a lower level of legal sanctions, when compared to the
benchmark case. To understand why, consider once again our policymaker. In the
substitution case each reduction in legal sanctions will have two effects. First, just like in
the benchmark case, it increases the amount of nonlegal sanctions being used, and
therefore shifts the policymaker to nonlegal sanctions with higher marginal costs.
Second, each reduction lowers the cost of nonlegal sanctions by raising the motivation of
individuals to inflict nonlegal sanctions. In other words, in the substitution case each
move to nonlegal sanctions will cause a smaller rise in the marginal cost of nonlegal
sanctions. Hence, the policymaker will reach the point in which the marginal costs of
legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal after substituting more legal sanctions.
Continuing to follow the numerical example presented above, the substitution
effect can be captured as a fall in the cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions when the legal
sanction is reduced. In table 3 I present a possible cost structure for such a case.
Legal
Sanction

C(LS)

Legal
Sanction

C(NLS)

C(TS)

results were not statistically significant. See also Walker & Marsh, supra note 77 at 40 (pointing out that
“in certain circumstances a severe sentence might even lower disapproval”).
82

See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD . 1 (2000); Juan Camilo
Cardenas & John Stranlund, Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out, 28 W ORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1719 (2000) (pointing out that the introduction of a regulatory environmental scheme
backed by legal sanctions could diminish the tendency of individuals to act according to group interests ).
83

Gneezy & Rustichini, id. at 5-8.

84

Although Gneezy and Rustichini do not state their explanation for their results in the terms used above,
they in effect employ a similar explanation. Gneezy and Rustichini hypothesis that the introduction of a
fine changes the nature of the transaction since while there exists a norm of not making use of the services
of the day care center for free, once a price is set for these services (in the form of a fine) being late no
longer violates the norm. Id. at 13-4. In their analysis Gneezy and Rustichini offer an additional explanation
for the behavior they documented that relies on a model in which parents hold imperfect information as to
the type of person the manager of the day-care center is (i.e. what kind of sanctions will she inflict to them
if they are late to pick up their child). In this model the use of a fine indicates the type of person the daycare center owner is and therefore causes individuals to increase the number of late arrivals. Id. at 10-13.
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500

100

500

71

171

600

110

400

63

173

700

124

300

56

180

Table 3: The Substitution Case

As is evident from table 3, the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions in
this case is 500 and 500, the combination in which the marginal cost of the two is equal.
Furthermore, table 3 demonstrates that the fall in the cost of nonlegal sanctions created
by the substitution effect shifted the cost minimizing combination to one in which a lower
amount of legal sanctions is being utilized.
4. Endogenous Legal Sanctions
In this subsection I turn to evaluate the way nonlegal sanctions might affect legal
sanctions. More precisely, it will be argued that judges, jurors, and prosecutors might
adjust legal sanctions, if legislatures choose to enla rge the total sanction by using
nonlegal sanctions. Furthermore, it will be shown that high mandatory nonlegal sanctions
might lead to the counter intuitive result of lowering the aggregate sanction offenders
face.
Some of the players in the criminal jus tice system, such as judges and
prosecutors, have a perception of what an appropriate sanction is, and in many cases they
hold substantial discretion over the sanctioning process. Thus, if legislatures add nonlegal
sanctions at a level that judges or prosecutors perceive to be unfair, they might
circumvent this by adjusting the legal sanction using their discretion, or by choosing not
to use the nonlegal sanctions added by the legislature. If, however, the supplemental
nonlegal sanction is large, in the sense that even on its own it is viewed as excessive, and
its application is mandatory, then the only option judges and prosecutors who wish to
avoid applying an excessive sanction have is not to convict the offender with an offence
that triggers the nonlegal sanction. 85 For example, a prosecutor reluctant to subject a
defendant to a severe mandatory shaming sanction that is attached to a certain crime,
might agree to plea him to a charge that does not trigger the shaming sanction. 86 This
type of behavior has in fact been documented in the contexts of The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and federal supplemental sanctions (such as the ban on holding firearms that
is attached to convictions of domestic abuse). 87
85
86

Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 M ICH. L. REV. 2385, 2451 (1997).
Id. Another example could be jurors who are reluctant to vote to convict. Id.

87

See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. L. RE V. 1284
(1997) (discussing the circumvention of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Robert A. Mikos, State
Crimes Carrying Federal Penalties: The Law and Economics of Federal Supplemental Sanctions,
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the circumvention of federal supplemental
sanctions).
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Adding high mandatory nonlegal sanctions to legal sanc tions might also affect the
plea bargaining process by raising the incentives of defendants to go to trial. 88 If
sanctions are mandatory, the only benefit of a plea agreement for defendants is the saving
in trial costs, which given a sufficiently high sanction will not justify forgoing the
opportunity of acquittal at trial. Eliminating the ability to reach plea agreements
regarding offenses with mandatory nonlegal sanction is expected to cause prosecutors,
who operate within budgetary constraints and want to encourage plea agreements, to
circumvent this sanction by reducing the charges to charges that do not trigger it.
To understand the argument better, one might wish to view the following
numerical example. 89 Assume that a prosecutor may charge a defendant with either
assault or sexual assault. The maximal sanction for assault is 500 and the maximal
sanction for sexual assault is 1,000. Both parties have equal probabilities to win at trial
with respect to both charges. Assuming that the prosecutor wishes to maximize the
sanction imposed on the defendant she will charge him with sexual assault. At this point
the defendant will agree to plea to sexual assault as long as the prosecutor offers him a
sanction that is lower than his expected sanction (0.5*1,000 = 500). Now assume a world
in which a mandatory nonlegal sanction of 1,100 is applied to those convicted of sexual
assault, but not to those convicted of assault. The introduction of this sanction eliminated
the incentive of the defendant to agree to plea to sexual assault, since the lowest sanction
the prosecutor can offer him (the mandatory 1,100), is larger than the expected sanction
at trial (0.5*(1,000 + 1,100) = 1,050). Thus, the only basis for a plea agreement in this
case can be an assault charge, which will allow the prosecutor to offer the defendant a
sanction that is slightly bellow his expected sanction at trial (0.5*500 = 250). The
different payoffs for defendants are compiled in table 4:

Nonlegal sanctions not added

Charge: Sexual Assault
Charge: Assault

Expected
Sanction
500
250

Plea Range
<500
<250

Nonlegal sanctions added
Expected
Sanction
1,050
250

Plea Range
1,100<
<250

Table 4: Sanctions with and without mandatory supplemental nonlegal sanctions

Furthermore, encouraging defendants to litigate rather than accept plea
agreements might lower the total sanction that is imposed on offenders. 90 The reason for
88

Mikos, id. (analysing this point in the context of federal supplemental sanctions). This is a general point
that holds with respect to mandatory sanctions. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory
Minimums, 28 W AKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 209 (1993).
89

The example in the text draws from Mikos, id.

90

Mikos, id.
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this is that once defendants can credibly threat to go to trial, prosecutors will either have
to agree to plea bargain to lesser charges that do not trigger the supplemental sanction
and have a lower legal sanction, or trial a small number of offenders and generate a few
large sanctions. Returning to the numerical example above, assume that the prosecutor
has a fixed budget of $20, trials cost prosecutors $10, plea agreements cost prosecutors
$1, there are 30 potential defendants to prosecute for sexual assault, and prosecutors and
defendants have equal bargaining power in the plea negotiation (i.e., they agree on a
sanction that is ha lf of the expected sanction). In a world with no supplemental nonlegal
sanctions, the prosecutor will be able to reach plea agreements with 20 defendants on
sexual assault charges, for a total sanction of 5,000. On the other hand, in a world with
supplemental nonlegal sanctions, pleading defendants to sexual assault is no longer an
option, thus, the prosecutor has three other options: plea 20 defendants to assault, for a
total sanction of 2,500; plea 10 defendants to assault and take one to trial on a sexua l
assault charge, for a total expected sanction of 2,300; or take two defendants to trial on a
sexual assault charge for a total expected sanction of 2,100.
This subsection has demonstrated that the actual legal sanction offenders face
might be adjusted once nonlegal sanctions are introduced. This is of importance since at
times legislatures might simply add nonlegal sanctions to existing legal sanctions, and
assume they succeeded to create higher sanction. 91 It would seem that nonlegal sanctions
are susceptible to this type of behavior since legislatures might only account for the cost
of inducing nonlegal sanctions, while ignoring the other social costs of sanctioning. 92
***
To sum up, in this Section I have argued that using nonlegal sanctions as a
substitute for costly legal sanctions could lower the aggregate cost of sanctioning.
Nevertheless, determining the efficiency of such a sanctioning regime depends on the
magnitude of the problems associated with the use of nonlegal sanctions that were
mapped out. Furthermore, designing a regime that will utilize nonlegal sanctions in an
optimal fashion requires taking into account the potential effects of legal sanctions on
nonlegal sanctions, and the potential effects of nonlegal sanctions on legal sanctions.
These general insights will be employed when I turn now to analyse the way in which sex
offenders are being sanctioned.

III.

A PUNITIVE APPROACH TOWARDS SORNLS

In this Section I will begin to evaluate a concrete example of using legally
induced nonlegal sanctions as punishment. Namely, I will present a case study of the
current practice of publicizing the names of sex offenders. I will begin my analysis by
reviewing the current content of SORNLs. I will then turn to point out that SORNLs have
questionable value as a crime prevention tool. Rather, I will argue that SORNLs should
91

Kahan, supra note 7 at 605 (noting that the use of alternative sanctions has caused sanctions to become
more severe since they were simply added to preexisting sanctions).
92

See supra note 38.
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be viewed as a sanction generating tool. Finally, I will evaluate the potential effects of
SORNLs on the future criminal behavior of offenders who are subjected to them and on
the legal sanctions that are applied to sex offenders.
1. Legal Background: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws
SORNLs, commonly known as Megan’s Laws, reflect a significant change in the
landscape of American criminal law. 93 In general, these laws require convicted sex
offenders, who are released into the community, to register as sex offenders, and provide
for some level of public notification as to the presence of a sex offender in the
community. Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columb ia have enacted their
own version of a SORNL. 94
Undoubtedly, the single event that triggered the overwhelming wave of
registration and notification legislation of the late 90s was the brutal murder of Megan
Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, on July 29, 1994. 95 Megan was raped and murdered by a
neighbor of the Kanka family, who lived across the street and was a convicted sex
offender. 96 Following the murder, Megan’s parents began a public campaign for the
adoption of sex offender registration and notification laws. Just two weeks after the
murder, bills providing for sex offender registration and notification were introduced to
the New Jersey General Assembly, 97 and by the end of October of that year, after an
abbreviated legislative process, the state’s SORNL was enacted. 98 At the same time, other
states started to follow in the footsteps of New Jersey, and enacted similar laws. 99
Politicians in Congress, who were aware of the growing national concern over sex
offenders, moved to introduce federal legislation on the matter. The Jacob Wetterling

93

In fact, these laws are not limited to the United States and have already crossed the Atlantic to England.
See Meghann J. Dugan, Megan’s Law or Sarah’s Law? A Comparative Analysis of Public Notification
Statutes in the United States and England, 23 LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP L. REV. 617 (2001) (comparing
American SORNLs with the English equivalent).
94

Smith, 538 U.S. at 90.

95

E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997). Though this murder triggered the nation wide
adoption of SORNLs such laws did exist previously. A prominent example of a state that had such a law
since the 1940s is California. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1947). The first state to introduce the
concept of public notification was Washington, which in 1990 enacted its Community Protection Act. See
W ASH. REV. CODE A NN. §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44130 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). As of 1983 five states enacted
some form of sex offender registration law. See In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914, 925 (Cal. 1983). Nevertheless,
until the case of Megan Kanka there was no sign that other states were about to adopt similar regimes.
96
E.B., id. at 1081.
97

Id..

98

Id. at 1081-2.

99

According to one account in 1994 prior to the enactment of any federal legislation on the matter twentyfive states had some form of a SORNL and sixteen other states were considering similar pieces of
legislation. See Houston, supra note 36 at 731.
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Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 100 enacted in
1994, required all states to enact sex offender registration laws. The Jacob Wetterling Act
gave states a strong incentive to comply by conditioning federal law enforcement
grants. 101 Federal lawmakers decided to go a step further in 1996, and required states to
add notification provisions to their laws. 102 Following this amendment, the guidelines
issued by the attorney general explicitly stated tha t information must be disseminated to
the general public when needed. 103
A full comparative analysis of SORNLs is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, some characterization of these laws is necessary in order to further the
discussion. With respect to the registration aspects of SORNLs, the minimal requirements
states must live up to are set out in the Jacob Wetterling Act. Every state is required to
have a sex offender registry, which must include the names, addresses, fingerprints, and
photographs of all sex offenders. 104 Registration is generally triggered by a conviction of
one of the offenses enumerated in the statute. 105 These offenses, in most cases, include all
sex crimes not withstanding the identity of the victim, and several specific crimes, such
as kidnapping, that require registration only if the victim of the crime was a minor. 106
Notice that despite the fact that SORNLs are perceived and marketed as laws aimed

100

42 U.S.C. § 14071 [hereinafter: the Jacob Wetterling Act].

101

42 U.S.C. § 14071(g).

102

42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (stating that “the State shall release the relevant information that is necessary to
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section”). Until 1996 federal
law did not require states to engage in notification, and it simply indicated that states “may release”
information in a way that they found would protect the public safety (42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)).
103

The attorney general guidelines provide that:
…a state cannot comply with the Act by releasing registration information only to law
enforcement agencies, to other governmental or non-governmental agencies or
organizations, to prospective employers, or to the victims of the registrants’ offenses.
States cannot comply by having purely permissive or discretionary authority for
officials to release registration information. Information must be released to members
of the public as necessary to protect the public from registered offenders.
Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 FED. REG. 572, 581 (1999) [hereinafter: The Final Guidelines].
104

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b). In addition the Jacob Wetterling Act requires states to collect information as to
identifying factors, anticipated future residence, offense history, and documentation of any treatment
received for mental abnormalities or personality disorders with respect to individuals that are deemed to be
sexually violent predators.
105

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)(1)(A) (basing registration requirements on past convictions). But see infra
Section IV 5 (discussing registration which is based on charges rather than on convictions).
106

42 U.S.C. §§ 14071 (a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A) (registration required of persons convicted of a sexually violent
offense or of a criminal offense against a minor, which includes several sexually oriented crimes,
kidnapping and false imprisonment).
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towards preventing child oriented sex crimes, 107 these laws have an extremely large scope
that covers all sex offenders.
Initial registration is conducted upon the conviction of the offender, his release
from incarceration, or his moving into a new state. 108 Following this registration,
offenders are required to update any change in their personal information, and verify their
information on an annual or quarterly basis. 109 As for the duration of registration, the
minimal period required by the Jacob Wetterling Act is ten years from the date of release
from prison, 110 yet any offender that has been convicted more than once of an enumerated
offense, has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or has been found to be a sexually
violent predator, must register for life. 111
Turning to the issue of notification, the Jacob Wetterling Act requires some level
of public notification, however it leaves room for diversity as to the details. In fact, states
do diverge dramatically on this matter. The predominant way of notification is by the
Internet. Currently 39 states and the District of Columbia operate websites that allow
visitors to obtain information about registered sex offenders. 112 While all websites
include general details such as name, date of birth, physical characteristics, and the
offense committed, 113 others include additional information, such as a photo of the
offender and a description of the mode of operation of the offender given in plain
107

Filler, supra note 44 at 355-8 (noting that in most legislative debates surrounding these laws legislatures
seem to represent these laws as laws that target sex offenders who victimise children).
In his remarks at the signing ceremony of Megan’s Law on May 17th , 1996 president William Jefferson
Clinton made the following remarks:
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to tell a community when
a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. We respect people’s rights, but today America
proclaims there is no greater right than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love.
Today America warns: If you dare prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever
you go. State to state, town to town.
Today, America circles the wagon around our children.
Available in LEXIS, Codes Library, Presdc File.
108

42 U.S.C. § 14071(b).

109

42 U.S.C. §§ 14071 (b)(1)(A)(ii); (b)(3).

110

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(A).

111

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(B).

112

As of 2002 34 States and the District of Columbia had such websites. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1(a)-24(a), Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (No. 01-729).
Ever since five additional states have begun to operate such websites: Iowa (see
http://www.iowasexoffenders.com/); Maine (see http://www4.informe.org/sor/); New Hampshire (see
http://www.state.nh.us/safety/nhsp/); Ohio (see http://www.drc.state.oh.us/search2.htm); and Oklahoma
(see http://docapp8.doc.state.ok.us/servlet/page?_pageid=190&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30), (all
last visited January 8, 2004).
113

The Michigan website offers an example of a rather minimalist one. See http://www.mipsor.state.mi.us/
(last visited January 8, 2004).
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terms. 114 This information can be obtained with respect to specific individuals and with
respect to specific geographical areas. 115
Aside from the Internet, states employ an array of notification tools. In California
notification is conducted on the basis of calling a 900 number and CD-ROMs that are
available at local police stations. 116 Other states require police officers to conduct
notification. 117 Perhaps the most intrusive of all are the Louisiana notification provisions.
Under the Louisiana SORNL an offender is required to give notice of the crime he has
committed, his name, and address to at least one person in every residence or business
within a one- mile radius in a rural area and a three square block area in an urban area. 118
In addition, the offender is required to publish at his expense an ad in the official journal
or a newspaper, which will include the details of his crime, his name, address, and
photo. 119 Louisiana courts may issue additional notification requirements, such as signs,
handbills, bumper stickers, or labeled clothing. 120
Finally, one should note that states differ as to whether an individual risk
assessment aimed towards determining the risk that a specific sex offender might reoffend should be conducted prior to notification. Some states, such as New Jersey,
Massachusetts and New York, chose to conduct such assessments. 121 In Massachusetts,
this program includes a special board that evaluates the offender and categorizes him into
one of three risk groups. Based on this risk assessment different levels of notification are
conducted. 122 At the same time, other states, such as Alaska, Connecticut and Oklahoma,

114

The New Jersey website offers such information. See http://www.njsp.org/info/reg_sexoffend.html (last
visited January 8, 2004).
115

See, e.g., the Michigan website, supra note 113.

116

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290.4(3), (4).

117

For example, the Alabama SORNL provides that the chief of police or the sheriff will notify the
presence of a sex offender to all persons living within 1,000ft. (in cities), 1,500ft. (in towns), and 2,00ft. (in
rural areas) of the residence of the sex offender. See A LA. CODE § 15-20-25(a).
118

LA. REV. STAT . § 542B(1)(a). Subsection (b) continues and requires the offender to notify the
superintendent of the school district in which he resides, and subsection (c) requires him to notify the
lessor, landlord, or owner of the property in which he resides.
119

LA . REV. STAT . § 542B(2)(a).

120

LA . REV. STAT . § 542B(3).

121

See N.J. STAT § 2C:7-8 (instructing the Attorney General to issue guidelines that will enable individual
risk assessment); M ASS. STAT . § 178K (establishing a board responsible for risk assessment); N.Y. CODE §
168-l (same).
122

M ASS. STAT . § 178K(2). More specifically, in case of level one (low risk) offenders the law requires
notification of law enforcement agencies and prohibits public notification (M ASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(a)).
With respect to level two (moderate risk) offenders the law requires that the information be disseminated to
law enforcement agencies and that this information be accessible to the public (M ASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(b)).
Finally, with respect to level three (high-risk) offenders the law requires that the police shall actively
disseminate the information regarding these offenders to the public (M ASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(c)).
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do not conduct individualized risk assessments, and use past convictions as the sole
criteria for notification. 123
2. The Preventative Approach Towards SORNLs
The main political force driving the enactment of SORNLs was the fear from
released sex offenders, and the assumption that they will assist in preventing future sex
crimes. 124 The logic of adopting these laws was that sex offenders have exceptionally
high recidivism rates, and that once members of communities know of the presence of a
sex offender they will be able to protect themselves. This line of thought is problematic
for two reasons. First, the assumption of high recidivism rates, as a general phenomenon
among all sex offenders, is questionable. Second, even if this assumption is valid,
SORNLs supply a poor tool for communities to protect themselves.
Legislatures enacting SORNLs often refer to “exceptionally high” recidivism
rates of sex offenders as a reason for their adoption. 125 This has also been an underlying
assumption in much of the scholarly work on SORNLs, 126 and reflects the attitude of the
general public. 127 Yet a close examination of the studies conducted with respect to sex
offenders’ recidivism rates reveals a picture that is more complicated then these
unquestioned assumptions. Several reviews of the empirical literature have pointed out
that interpreting the recidivism data is a complicated task, and that at least according to

123

OKLA. STAT . §§ 581-589; CONN. STAT . §§ 54-250 –54-261; A LASKA STAT . §§ 12.63.010 - 12.63.100.

124

See, e.g., Filler, supra note 44 at 329-46; Daniel L. Feldman, The “Scarlet Letter Laws” of the 1990s: A
Response to Critics, 60 A LB. L. RE V. 1081, 1101-1109 (1997).
125

See Filler, id. at 335-8 (reviewing statistical claims made by legislatures at the time of the enactment of
SORNLs). Several legislatures have mentioned high recidivism rates as part of the legislative findings
underlying the legislation. See, e.g., A LA. CODE § 15-20-20.1 (“The Legislature finds that the danger of
recidivism posed by criminal sex offenders and that the protection of the public from these offenders is a
paramount concern or interest to government”); A RK. CODE § 12-12-902 (“The General Assembly finds
that sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody”); IDAHO CODE § 18-8302
(“The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a significant risk of reoffense”); NEB. STAT . § 29-4002
(“The Legis lature finds that sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses”).
126

See, e.g., David S. DeMatto, Welcome to Anytown U.S.A. – Home of Beautiful Scenery (and Convicted
Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 VILL. L. REV. 581,
581, (1998) (stating “[o]ne of the most vexing aspects of sexual predation is the high recidivism rate,
especially among sex offenders who target and victimize children”); Houston, supra note 36 at 731 (noting
that “sex offenders have the highest rates of recidivism of any group of criminals”).
127

See, e.g., Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental Disorder,
and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 275, 300 (2000) (noting that “[t]he public shares
the sentiment of the legislature and fears the repeat sex offender who is incapable of rehabilitation”);
Bedarf, supra note 53 at 898 (citing a Canadian study indicating public perceptions of high recidivism rates
among sex offenders as a group). Similar attitudes rise out of advocacy groups promoting SORNLs. As the
website of Klasskids, a foundation dedicated to stopping crimes against children, put it “[s]ex offenders
pose a high risk of re -offending after release from custody”. See http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-legmeg.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
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some studies sex offenders actually have lower recidivism rates than other groups of
offenders. 128 Recently, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study showed that sex offenders
generally have a lower rate of re-arrest than other violent offenders, but they do have a
substantially higher chance to be re-arrested for a new violent sex offense. 129 These
studies raise the question, why should we develop comprehensive registration and
notification regimes towards sex offenders when we do not create such a regime for
murderers, thieves, and drug dealers? 130
Nevertheless, pointing out that we might want to adopt similar laws that will
apply to other types of criminals, does not demonstrate that we should not adopt such a
scheme with respect to sex offenders. A more serious problem of SORNLs is that even if
sex offenders do represent a more significant risk when compared to other offenders,
SORNLs are simply a problematic crime prevention tool. In the few studies conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of SORNLs researchers could find no statistically significant
difference in recidivism rates between offenders who were subjected to notification and
those who were not. 131 A study evaluating the prevention potential of the Massachusetts
SORNL,132 which knowingly made unrealistically optimistic assumptions, 133 found that
out of 136 serious sex offenders that were incarcerated only 6 had a good or poor to
moderate probability of being notified to their victims (or guardian) before hand. 134 Thus,
this study provides an indication of the limited preventative value of SORNLs. 135
128

See, e.g., Bedarf, id. at 893-98 (reviewing data regarding recidivism rates and concluding that recidivism
“is not as a significant of a problem as [some] claim”); Small, supra note 8 at 1456-8 (reviewing and
analyzing sex offenders’ recidivism rates); Simon, supra note 127 at 301 (noting that “[w]hat is clear is that
there is no emp irical evidence that predictions of future sex offenses based on convictions for past ones are
accurate”). See also Lisa C. Trivits & N. Dickon Reppucci, Application of Megan’s Law to Juveniles, 57
A M. PSYCHOLOGIST 690, 698-700 (2002) (reviewing the literature regarding sex offender recidivism rates
and emphasizing that juvenile sex offenders have significantly lower recidivism rates).
129

Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex Offenders Are on Parole or Probation, Bureau
of Justice Statistics News Release, Feb. 2, 1997, available at 1997 WL 53093 (D.O.J.).
130

Registration statutes that applied to more general categories of criminals date back to the 1930s. See
Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. RE V. 60,
61-4 (1954); Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (1936-1937).
131

See Logan, supra note 44 at 1337 (citing two unpublished studies). See also Simon, supra note 127 at
300 (noting that “there is no empirical evidence that sexual offender registration laws achieve their
intended aims”); Trivits & Reppucci, supra note 128 at 695 (noting that “there is currently no evidence that
the registration and notification statutes have protected children in the community).
132

Anthony J. Petrosino & Carolyn Petrosino, The Public Safety Potential of Megan’s Law in
Massachusetts: An Assessment From a Sample of Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 140, (1999).
133

Petrosino and Petrosino chose for their study only sex offenders who were actually incarcerated. In
addition, they assumed perfect compliance with the law, perfect notification by the police, and error-free
risk assessment of offenders. Finally, their study focused on sexual psychopaths, rather than felony sex
offenders, again most likely overstating the power of the Massachusetts SORNL. See Id. at 145-7.
134

Id. at 150.
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Evaluating the way in which SORNLs work demonstrates the difficulties they
have in preventing crimes. First, SORNLs depend on sex offenders for information.
Given the limited resources that are devoted to verifying registration, and the lack of a
central identification system in the United States, it is quite simple for offenders to slip
through the cracks of the registration system by not registering. A recent survey
conducted by Parents for Megan’s Law, a non-profit advocacy organization, found that
on average states are unable to account for 24 percent of the sex offenders that are
suppose to be listed. 136 In the state of California alone 33,000 offenders are unaccounted
for. 137 Furthermore, it would seem reasonable to assume that sex offenders that are
engaged in re-offending are disproportionately represented within this group, since other
things equal, they have a higher motivation to avoid registration. Thus, states are actually
putting efforts into compiling information on those sex offenders who pose a lower risk.
Second, public notification might exacerbate the problem of registration
avoidance since the nonlegal sanctions that are triggered by it give offenders a strong
incentive not to register. 138 In other words, offenders that would willfully register if their
information would only be used for investigative purposes, refuse to register once they
realize tha t the information will be widely disseminated. Thus, public notification might
reduce the amount of information law enforcement agencies hold with respect to sex
offenders.
Finally, SORNLs do nothing to prevent offenders from traveling to a close by
neighborhood, where they are unknown, and committing their crimes there. 139 This issue
was not over looked by legislatures during the enactment of these laws. For example, in
the debate in the New York assembly over that state’s SORNL one of the assemblymen
noted that “[a]ll any pervert has to do who lives on my street is hop on the subway and in
five minutes he is in another community where there are children who are going to the
store for milk or going to school.”140
135

Id. at 154 (concluding that the Massachusetts SORNL has a limited ability to prevent stranger-predatory
sex crimes).
136

Kim Curtis, Sex-Offender Registries Flawed Across Nation; Non-Profit Group Estimates that up-todate Address Lacking for 1 in 4 People who should Appear on List, A KRON BEACON J. (OHIO), Feb. 7,
2003, at 7. See also Houston, supra note 36 at 733 (pointing out claims that only fifty percent of sex
offenders have in fact registered).
137

Curtis, Id.

138

Dugan, supra note 93 at 635 (noting that “sex offenders hear about the harassment and decide they
would rather not register, despite the risk of getting caught, rather than be harassed by the public”); Bedarf,
supra note 53 at 909 (noting that “harassment is likely to drive a sex offender to… fail to comply with his
community notification duties”).
139

Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public
Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV CONFINEMENT 303, 317 (1997) (noting that
“[t]here is nothing to stop the sexual abuser who want to molest children or rape women from going into
neighboring communities, where he or she is not known, to select a victim”).
140

Filler, supra note 44 at 345 (quoting New York assemblyman Sullivan).
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In sum, this subsection has demonstrated that despite the fact that SORNLs and
their public notification provisions aim to prevent future crimes, their ability to do so is
questionable. In fact, given their limited value, voices calling to shift resources from
these programs to other social programs are beginning to emerge. 141 In the next
subsection I will turn to develop an alternative approach towards SORNLs.
3. A Punitive Approach Towards SORNLs
Thus far we have seen that it is unclear whether the preventative value of
SORNLs justifies the amount of resources devoted to them. Nevertheless, these laws can
fulfill an additional function, namely, to punish sex offenders by inducing nonlegal
sanctions. In order to demonstrate the punitive nature of SORNLs I will review the
nonlegal sanctions that are triggered by them, and argue that these sanctions are punitive
and not preventative, since they are mainly driven by a preference for reciprocity and by
a norm of sanctioning sex offenders.
According to the preventative approach towards SORNLs, the nonlegal sanctions
induced by these laws can mainly be seen as preventative measures taken by members of
society, who wish to minimize the risk associated with living in proximity to sex
offenders. Undoubtedly, SORNLs do cause sex offenders to suffer from such nonlegal
sanctions. SORNLs have, for instance, caused offenders to lose income opportunities that
involve close work with potential victims. 142 Nevertheless, a closer look at the sanctions
that are incurred by sex offenders as a result of SORNLs demonstrates that these
sanctions are not merely preventative.
First, one can see that sanctions are applied to sex offenders by individuals who
agree to do so because they wish to avoid nonlegal sanctions, which are applied to those
who refuse to sanction offenders. For example, employers have terminated sex offenders’
employment because they were concerned from the reactions of their customers if they
would have continued to employ offenders. 143 This kind of behavior is in line with
141

See, e.g., Editorial, Megan’s Law: Good Intentions, Impossible Task , J. & COURIER, Feb. 12, 2003, at 7
(arguing that funds spent on the implementation of SORNLs “could be spent on improved day care for
children of poor working parents. It’s money that could be spent in the nation’s classrooms. It’s money that
could go toward after-school programs for latchkey kids”).
142

See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 124 at 1106 (noting that in California regis tration and notification
managed to detect sex offenders working in positions that might place potential victims at risk).
143

See Brian D. Gallagher, Now that We Know Where they are, What Do We Do With them?: The
Placement of Sex Offenders in the Age of Megan’s Laws, 7 W IDENER J. PUB. L. 39, 53 (1997) (reporting of
a case in which a business rescinded a job offer to released sex offender due to negative public reaction);
Doe v. Pataki, 940 F.Supp. 603, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (describing an incident in which a gas station that
employed a sex offender was boycotted); Brief of the Office of the Public Defender of the State of New
Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01729) [hereinafter: New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief] (reporting that an offender was refused a job
because of publicity concerns of the hiring company) and 17-8 (describing a case in which after the
offender’s employer acknowledged that “He [the offender ] has demonstrated outstanding performance. He
has shown his ability to be an excellent worker and I find him to be a highly respected person in our
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nonlegal sanctions that are driven by a sanctioning norm, which is enforced by a
secondary set of nonlegal sanctions.
An additional characteristic of the nonlegal sanctions generated by SORNLs,
which indicates that these sanctions are punitive, is that in a significant amount of cases
the sanctions are directed against the family members of the offenders. 144 For example, in
a research conducted in Wisconsin two thirds of the offenders reported some kind of
negative effects on the lives of their family members. 145 It is difficult to see how
ridiculing a son of an offender to the point he chooses to leave his school’s football team
can be categorized as a preventative measure. 146 Rather, these cases indicate that the
sanctioning of sex offenders has become a focal point for a sanctioning norm in those
communities. 147 Since norm driven nonlegal sanctions are based on the willingness to
engage in costly acts, publicly sanctioning the children of sex offenders can serve just as
good a signal as sanctioning the offenders themselves. 148
A third characteristic of the sanctions that are applied to sex offenders is that they
are arbitrary, singeling out specific individuals for no apparent reason. 149 This picture is
company” the employer nevertheless terminated the offender’s employment due to public pressure). Other
examples include community members who simply fear to voice opposition to public reactions towards sex
offenders. In Texas a resident who voiced an opinion against the local notification policies refused to
identify himself to the media out of fear of retaliation. See Tracey-Lynn Claough, Neighbors Warned About
Sex Offender, DALLAS M ORNING NEWS, May 24, 1996, at A1.
144

See, e.g., Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 609 (noting a case in which members of the family of a sex offender
were harassed); Small, supra note 8 at 1466 (reporting of a case in which the offenders’ sister in law and
her children were harassed and even shot at).
145

Richard Z. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Managing High Risk
Criminal or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 375, 383 (2000). It should be noted that
this number overstates the number of nonlegal sanctions that are aimed towards family members since it
includes cases in which family members saw themselves hurt solely by the publication of the offenders’
name. See also THE NAT ’L CRIM. JUST . A SS’N, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION:
PROBLEM A VOIDANCE & BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION, & SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION &
NOTIFICATION COSTS SURVEY RESULTS 32 (1999) [hereinafter: NAT ’L CRIM. JUST . A SS’N STUDY ] (pointing
out that children of offenders are being harassed).
146

Zevitz & Farkas, id.

147

See Posner, supra note 3 at 93 (pointing out that norm based nonlegal sanctions might target relatives of
wrongdoers).
148

To be sure, the sanctioning of the children of sex offenders can also be explained on a rather crude
theory of reciprocity. Since inflicting harm to the children of an offender will cause psychic harm to the
offender himself, one can view these sanctions as a way to sanction the offender himself.
149

Richard G. Zevitz & Marry Ann Farkas, Sex offender Community Notification: Assessing the Impact in
Wisconsin, National Institute of Justice - Research in Brief at 9 (2000) (available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij). See also Scott Matson & Roxanna Lieb, Community Notification in
Washington
State:
1996
Survey
of
Law
Enforcement
(1996)
(available
at
http://www.wa.gov/wsipp/crime/cprot.html) (pointing out that communities can be unpredictable in their
reactions towards sex offenders).
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consistent with nonlegal sanctions that are driven by a sanctioning norm, and not with
preventative nonlegal sanctions. As we have seen, sanctioning norms will tend to emerge
around focal points of a signaling equilibrium, and these focal points might be
determined arbitrarily. On the other hand, one would expect preventative nonlegal
sanctions based on a rational thought process to be applied in an apparently logical
fashion.
Another repeat theme in the description of the sanctions that target sex offenders
is that they are conducted by groups rather by individuals, 150 and reflect a “lynch- mob
attitude”. 151 Group based nonlegal sanctions are an indicator that signaling behavior is at
hand. They demonstrate that participation in sanctioning offenders is driven by a need to
conform to the norms of the group applying the sanctions, and not by a personal decision
aimed at protecting the individual from future harms. 152
Finally, it should be noted that the acts of violent vigilantism suffered by sex
offenders are consistent with punitive, rather than preventative nonlegal sanctions. Since
the adoption of SORNLs sex offenders have been subjected to acts such as threats, 153
vandalism of their property, 154 physical assaults, 155 and gunshots fired at their houses. 156
150

For example, in one reported case a Wisconsin 60 year old man in a wheelchair was driven out of his
house by a demonstration with 100 participants (this was only one of the eight times he was forced to
move). See Mary Zahn, Watching the Offenders, M ILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL , March 29, 1998, at 1;
Gallagher, supra note 143 at 53 (reporting that community members held a rally to protest the release of a
sex offender); New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra note 143 at 8 (reporting on a demonstration
with 250 participants near a house of an offender). This reality is true out of the United States as well. See
Dugan, id. (describing reactions in England).
151

Amy L. Van Duyn, Note, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional Analysis of Community
Notification Provisions In Sex Offender Statues, 47 DRAKE L. RE V. 635, 650 (1999); Dugan, supra note 93
at 618.
152

Posner, supra note 3 at 93 (noting that “[t]he reason people join mobs is that it is better to be a member
of a mob than its target”).
153

Small, supra note 8 at 1466 (reporting on death threats made against the sister in law of an offender);
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra note 143 at 8 (reporting that offender received letter
spelled out of newspaper cuttings saying “We’ll be watching you asshole”), 9 (reporting that offender was
yelled at “Stop fucking little girls. I’m going to kill you” and later was attacked by a man wearing a ski
mask and carrying a gun that who told him “If you don’t get out of this neighborhood I’m going to kill
you”), and 11-2 (reporting on several incidents of threats that were made to offenders).
154

See, e.g., Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New
Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 569, 579 (1995) (reporting on the case of Joseph Gallardo, a
Washington sex offender whose house was burned down); Zevitz & Farkas, supra note 145 at 383
(describing a case in which the car of the offender was vandalized); Small, supra note 8 at 1466 (same);
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 12 (describing a series of such incidents including placing
human feces on the steps of offender’s home, slashing the tires of offender’s car and destroying offender’s
mailboxes).
155

Pataki, 940 F.Supp. at 610 (describing an incident in which an offender was punched in the face); New
Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 9 (describing an incident in which two men broke into the
offenders’ residence and attacked a man they mistook for him) and 10-11 (describing an incident in which
an offender was struck with a crowbar).
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Despite the fact that these acts are relatively rare, 157 they are still a significant sanction
from the perspective of potential offenders, since they are very large in those cases in
which they are applied.
In sum, the picture arising from the different characteristics of the nonlegal
sanctions that are generated by SORNLs is of a social process, which is well beyond
communities taking precautionary steps. This conclusion is also supported by the only
available systematic study of the nonlegal sanctions incurred by sex offenders as a result
of SORNL. This study reported that 83 percent of offenders were excluded from their
place of residence, 158 and over 50 percent were terminated from their place of
employment. 159 These large numbers seem to reflect a general sanctioning norm that sex
offenders are subject to.
Having argued that SORNLs should be viewed as a punitive tool, the question
that remains to be addressed is should they be used as such a tool. Though one cannot
offer a definitive answer to this question, one can point out several characteristics of
SORNLs that might make them an effective sanction generating tool. SORNLs single out
sex offenders as a distinct class of criminals that is subjected to special legal treatment.
This is of importance, since in order for a norm of inflicting nonlegal sanctions to
emerge, there needs to exist a focal point around which this norm will be formed. The
law can create such a focal point since it enjoys moral power and tends to focus public
attention. 160 By singling out sex offenders, SORNLs have created a focal point for a
signalling equilibrium, in which a norm of sanctioning sex offenders can emerge.
An additional reason policymakers should use shame sanctions only with respect
to a limited group of criminals is that the cost of inducing these sanctions will rise as their
use becomes common. The explanation for this can be fo und in the theoretical analysis of
nonlegal sanctions presented above. With respect to preference driven nonlegal sanctions,
the conventional assumption of marginally decreasing utility points out that over time
people will derive less pleasure from sanctioning, and will therefore engage in less of it.
As to norm based nonlegal sanctions, since these sanctions are based on signaling,
individuals might stop sanctioning once they manage to send a credible signal as to their
type.
156

Robert Hanley, Neighbor Admits Firing Gun Into Home of Paroled Rapist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998,
at 10B (reporting on the case of a shooting at the house of a sex offender in Linden New Jersey); New
Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 8 (describing a shooting incident).
157

See Zevitz & Farkas, supra note 145 at 381 (reporting that in only three percent of the cases did sex
offenders report acts of vigilantism); Matson & Lieb, supra note 149 at 15 (reporting that 3.5 percent of
offenders report cases of harassment).
158

Zevitz & Farkas, id.

159

Id.

160

For an analysis of the ability of the law to create focal points see generally Richard McAdams, A Third
Model of Legal Compliance, Testing for Expressive Effects in Hawk/Dove Games (2003) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
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Finally, singling out sex crimes is desirable for several reasons. First, from the
perspective of offenders, sex is an ideal context to inflict suffering through shame.
Psychologically, we are inclined to be shameful of issues that relate to our sexual activity,
especially when this activity is considered deviant. 161 This unique characteristic of sex
points out that sex offenders will suffer from a substantial internal nonlegal sanction
when their acts are publicly exposed. Second, from the perspective of the sanctioning
public, there exists a cross-cultural consensus over the shamefulness of sex crimes. 162
Despite some potential disagreements as to what constitutes a sex crime, 163 it would seem
that this consensus carries on to American society. 164 Even among criminals, sex
offenders are considered to be worthy of sanctioning and shaming. 165 This characteristic
of sex assures us that the public will unite under the sex offender banner, and inflict
external nonlegal sanctions to sex offenders. It is for this reason that in England during
the days of the pillory this sanction was mainly used to punish sexually oriented
crimes. 166 Thus, unlike the arguments presented by some commentators, 167 basing the
sanctioning of sex offenders on nonlegal sanctions has significant advantages.

161

See Whitman, supra note 6 1064-5 and sources cited there (1998) (describing the connection between
shame and sex).
162

See James T. Tedeschi & Richard B Felson, VIOLENCE , A GGRESSION, AND COERCIVE A CTIONS 334
(1994) (pointing out that rape was one of the three most heavily punished crimes in all societies in a survey
of 110 societies).
163

A clear exception to this is the attitude of Americans towards sodomy laws and homosexual acts. As
was evident from the public reactions to the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 123
S.Ct. 2472 (U.S. 2003) which held sodomy laws unconstitutional, there are groups in America that believe
that homosexual acts should be criminalized and those who commit them should be shamed, while others
believe that such acts should be legal and there is no shame in committing them.
164

See, e.g., Kunz, supra note 36 at 454 (“Few crimes spark as strong or distinctive an aversion as sexual
offenses against children”); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due
Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1999)
(“Sex offenders are the scourge of modern America”); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 P SYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 506 (1998) (“perhaps more than
any other group, sex offenders are the pariahs of our society. They deserve this treatment and worse, most
people think, and this social consensus is reflected in our present legal rules and practices”); Alison Virag
Greissman, Note, The Fate of “Megan’s Law” in New York, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 181 (1996)
(“Sexual crimes disgust, anger, and frighten Americans in a way that no other human act does”).
165

See, e.g., Rob Tripp, The Bernardo Trial: Fellow Inmates Despise Homolka, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 11,
1995, at A3 (“[t]here is an unwritten code that regards sex offenders and child abusers lowest on the prison
pecking order”); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 327, 339 (2003)
(“Within the hierarchy of prisons, moreover, sex offenders in general - and child molesters in particular are considered the lowest of the low”); Gallagher, supra note 143 at 63 (quoting a prison inmate describing
the harsh treatment child molesters are subjected to in prison).
166

See Beattie, supra note 51 at 464-65. Furthermore, even as the use of the pillory diminished its main use
continued to be for sex offenders. Beattie, id. at 615 (noting that three out of the five crimes that were
punished by the pillory were of a sexual nature).
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In sum, this subsection demonstrated that SORNLs are in fact punitive and that
using them in order to sanction sex offenders might be a sensible policy. Nonetheless,
given the limited information we currently hold regarding the actual effects created by
SORNLs, this conclusion is tentative in nature. I now turn to evaluate some of the
potential problems using SORNLs as punishment might cause.
4. SORNLs, Stigmas, and Marginal Deterrence
In the general discussion above I argued that sanctioning regimes based on
nonlegal sanctions run the risk of raising the crime rate of the criminals that will be
subjected to these sanctions. 168 This argument was based both on psychological aspects
of stereotypes and stigmas, and on economic aspects of marginal deterrence. In this
subsection I shall demonstrate that SORNLs might in fact create such a problem.
There are two reasons to suspect that SORNLs might trigger the psychological
process associated with stereotypes and stigmas. 169 First, SORNLs constantly remind
offenders of their social status and expected behavior. As one offender put it, “It’s hard
to, in a manner of speaking, to move on and try to put things behind when you’re
constantly reminded by the rules that you are a sex offender and the rules more or less
make you feel like it just happened yesterday….The rules don’t let you have a normal life
and the rules are a constant reminder that you’re not a normal person.”170 This state of
mind may exacerbate the self- fulfilling aspects of stigmas. 171 Second, SORNLs might
cause sex offenders the mental processes that trigger self- fulfilling behavior by lowering
their expectation with respect to their own performance, 172 and by creating stress and
anxiety. 173
167

See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 6 at 1092 (opposing the use of shame sanctions in the context of sex
crimes); Bedarf, supra note 53 at 912 (arguing that “in the context of sex offenses, where the community’s
reaction is highly emotional, and sometimes violent, shaming is inappropriate”).
168

See supra notes 54-67 at accompanying text.

169

To be sure, it should be noted that to this day the stereotype threat literature has not evaluated whether
the stereotypes associated with sex offenders trigger this effect. This is not surprising given the
methodological problems of conducting experiments aimed at testing such a hypothesis and the fact that
this is a young and emerging line of literature. Nevertheless, the studies of stereotype threat do point out
that the mechanism described within them could be applied to any group. See, e.g., Wheeler & Petty, supra
note 58 at 804 (noting that “a member of any group targeted by negative stereotypes can show stereotype
threat effects in the domains relevant to the stereotype”); and Steele, supra note 58 at 617 (stating that
stereotype threat “affects the members of any group about whom there exists some generally known
negative stereotype”).
170

Zevitz & Faraks, supra note 145 at 385.

171

See Steele & Aronson, supra note 58 at 806-8.

172

See, e.g., Winick, supra note 164 at 557 (noting that SORNLs produce “the feeling that improvement or
change is hopeless”); Bedarf, supra note 53 at 911 n151 (quoting an offender stating that “I got the feeling
no one cares about me, so why should I care about myself and what I do?”).
173

As one sex offender explained “…Well, there is no more pressure than being exploited by media, the
people you work with, the people you live with, relatives, and so the pressure is constantly there. And
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Turning to the economic perspective, SORNLs seem to create a problem of
marginal deterrence, since in many cases they deprive offenders of the opportunity to
regain any new social capital. Although SORNLs do not attach a physical mark to sex
offenders, as did branding punishments in eighteenth century England or scarlet letter
punishments in colonial times, they come as close as possible to such a scheme. SORNLs
attach specific information to sex offenders in a way that this information becomes a part
of their identity. This information causes detrimental consequences, including loss of
housing, disruption of personal relationships, and loss of employment. 174 Thus, sex
offenders who are subject to SORNLs find themselves with little to no social capital, and
therefore the future nonlegal sanctions of these individuals are eliminated. In fact, it has
been reported that some offenders have chosen to return to prison since that is their only
housing option. 175 At the extreme, SORNLs could even bring sex offenders to situations
in which they literally have nothing to lose. This can be seen in several cases in which
offenders committed suicide as a direct result of notification. 176 These cases reflect a
potential breakdown of a system of deterrence, since there is perhaps no threat that the
law can use in order to deter individuals who are willing to commit suicide. 177
On the other hand, it should be noted that the registration aspects of SORNLs
might have an advantage from a deterrence perspective. A unified database that is at the
disposal of law enforcement agencies might raise the probability of detection for past
offenders. This would especially be the case in those jurisdictions that require sex
offenders as part of their registration scheme to submit DNA samples. 178 Thus, SORNLs
might raise the expected sanction facing past offenders, and could therefore deter them
from committing future crimes.
because they’re [sex offenders] miserable, then that would put them in that cycle to recommit the offense”.
Zevitz & Faraks, supra note 145 at 388.
174
See supra Section III 3.
175

Zevitz & Faraks, supra note 145 at 382.

176

See, e.g., AP, Suicide Is Recalled as Maine Revisits Megan's Law, Released Sex Offender Shot Himself
After Neighborhood Notification, W ASH. POST , Feb. 17, 1998, at A2 (reporting on an offender committing
suicide just two days after notification); Todd S. Purdum, Suicide Tied to Megan's Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1998 at A16 (reporting about two separate incidents of offenders committing suicide after notification);
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra note 143 at 22-3 (describing numerous incidents of
offenders committing suicide as a result of notification).
It should be noted that the problem of individuals that are subjected to shaming sanctions and are
driven to suicide is not unique to American culture or to the context of SORNLs. See e.g., Braithwaite,
supra note 66 at 138 (noting that cases of suicide due to corporate malpractice are common in Japan); J.
Beattie, OTHER CULTURES 176 (1964) (relying on work of others to report that shame caused suicide
among Tobriand Islanders); Persons, supra note 9 at 1527 (reporting on a case of a patron of a prostitute
who committed suicide after his name was published in a newspaper as part of a shaming scheme).
177

See Alan M. Dershowtiz, W HY TERRORISM W ORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT , RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE 29 (2002) (pointing out that in the context of suicide bombers “the usual deterrent strategy
of threatening death to the perpetrator will not work”).
178

As of 2003 29 states collected DNA samples from sex offenders. See Terry & Furlong, SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION (2nd ed., 2003) III-3-III4.
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5. Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of SORNLs
In this subsection I turn to evaluate the effects of SORNLs on plea bargaining. 179
The two main predictions of the theoretical framework developed above with respect to
plea agreements were that mandatory registration will cause defendants to reject plea
offers and opt for trials, and that this position will cause defendants and prosecutors to
circumvent SORNL by pleading defendants to offenses that do not trigger registration.180
Regretfully, since the enactment of modern day SORNLs no empirical studies have been
conducted to evaluate their effects on plea bargain negotiations. Thus, the main evidence
presented here will be anecdotal. Nevertheless, this evidence as a whole does present
persuasive indications for the validity of the model.
Several indications point out that defendants withdrew from plea agreements upon
learning of the registration requirement that will be triggered by a conviction. 181 First, a
significant amount of litigation has been dedicated to the question whether defendants
may withdraw a plea for that reason. 182 In addition, a similar picture arises from news
reports covering sex crime cases. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, a defendant
withdrew from a plea agreement that capped his prison sentence at three and a half years
and opted for a trial that could end up in a prison sentence of over twenty-eight years,
under the explicit argument that he was not aware of the registration requirement. 183 In
another case, a defendant who was accused of having sex with a teenage girl initially
agreed to plead guilty to lewd and lascivious acts with a child younger than 16, 184 yet
after he learned of the registration requirements that he will be subjected to, he chose to
179

Generally, studies of SORNLs have overlooked their potential effects on plea bargaining behavior. For
an exception see Kunz, supra note 36 at 476-7 (noting intuitively that SRONL might result in fewer plea
bargains and as a result in fewer sex offenders being punished).
180

See supra Section II 4.

181

It should be noted that the fact that some defendants were not aware of the registration requirements
might lead to some skepticism over the deterrence power of SORNLs. After all, a prerequisite for any
punishment to be an effective deterrent is knowledge of the punishment. Nevertheless, one can expect that
over time the registration requirements of SORNLs will become common knowledge.
182

Generally courts have been reluctant to allow such withdraws. See, e.g., Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d
900 (Minn. 2002) (denying petition to withdraw a guilty plea); State v. Anderson, No. 98074637, 2001 WL
1608560 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 2001) (same); State v. Koenig, 2001 WL 950044 (Minn. App. Aug. 21,
2001) (same); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2001) (same); State ex rel. Chauvin v.
State, 814 So.2d 1, (La. App. 1 Cir. 2000) (same); People v. Clark, 704 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.
2000) (same). But see State v. Wiita, 744 So.2d 1232 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1999) (allowing defendant to
withdraw guilty plea due to the potential effects the state’s new SORNL). To be sure, such withdraws do
not necessarily reflect cases which ended up going to trial. In some instances it is quite possible that if a
withdrawal was allowed the parties could then agree on a lower legal sanction and avoid trial.
183

Susan Carroll, Teen out of Plea Deal in Sex Case, Ex-Football Player will Face Jury Trial in Assault on
Girl, THE A RIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 2003, at B5.
184

Brett Barrouquere, Man may Withdraw Plea of No Content in Sex Case, SARASOTA HEARLD -TRIB, Aug.
24, 1999, at 1B.
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rescind his plea and go to trial. 185 Finally, policymakers influencing sex offender
legislation have voiced concerns regarding the tendency of offenders to reject plea
agreements as a result of registration. 186
As to the second prediction, namely, that prosecutors and defendants will attempt
to contract around SORNLs, a good place to begin the examination is California, which
was the first state to adopt a sex offender registration law back in the 1940s. Evidence
from California dating back to the 1960s indicates that prosecutors and defendants
contracted around the registration requirements imposed by California law by using
section 650½ of the California Penal Code, 187 which criminalized “openly outrageous
public decency” and did not trigger registration. When the California Court invalidated
this piece of legislation, because it found it to be vague, it acknowledged that at the time
the main use of section 650½ was to allow persons accused of sex crimes to plead guilty
to it so they could avoid the stigma associated with registration. 188 Additional evidence of
this practice was pointed out by an empirical study conducted in the county of Los
Angeles regarding the enforcement and administration of the sections of the California
Criminal Code that regulate adult homosexual behavior. 189 As noted by this study, section
650½ was commonly used to deal with judicial concerns over nonlegal sanctions, such as
lose of employment, that could have resulted from registration. 190
Additional indications for the contracting around hypothesis can be found in
media reports. The highly publicized case of Gary Wayne Jackson, a repeat sex offender
from Oklahoma, who succeeded in avoiding registration by pleading to nonsexual
charges, brought this practice to the attention of the Oklahoma public. 191 Yet Jackson’s
case was not unique. According to one newspaper, during the year 2001 forty-seven cases
in Tulsa County were identified as cases in which allegations of a sexual nature were

185

Brett Barrouquere, Menard Rescinds Plea in Sex Case, SARASOTA HEARLD -TRIB., Sept. 9, 1999, at 3B.

186

As one member of Maine’s Commission to Improve Community Safety and Sex Offender
Accountability noted “requiring sex offenders to register for life may make them refuse a plea agreement”.
See David Hench, Recommendation Due on Sex Offender Rules, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 1, 2003,
at 1A.
187

CAL. PEN. CODE § 650½ (West, 1957).

188

In re Davis, 242 Cal.App.2d 645, 666 n.21 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1966).

189

See The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and
Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 647, 771-5 (1966).
190

Id.

191

Bill Braun, Prison Not Part of Plea Proposal, TULSA W ORLD, Jan. 18, 2002 at 1. A second case that
took place in the same time frame and seems to have also affected public opinion on the matter is the case
of Cory B. West. West was originally charged with one count of first-degree rape and two counts of sexual
battery. He eventually reached a plea agreement with prosecutors according to which he was granted a
deferred sentence, which allowed the case to be dismissed with no conviction if West completes a four-year
probation. See Bill Braun, Plea Deal Nets Man no Time in Sex Case, TULSA W ORLD, Feb. 1, 2002, at 13.
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pleaded down to a nonsexual charge. 192 A similar picture arises out of a report of a case
in Georgia, in which apparently the defendant and the prosecutor cooperated in order to
rescind a registration condition even though the Georgia SORNL required registration. 193
In sum, we can see that there exists evidence that supports the predictions of the
theoretical bargaining model. Yet aside from the direct effects on sanctioning, the plea
bargaining behavior surrounding SORNLs has unique effects due to the specific context
of these laws. First, this behavior might lead law enforcement agencies to have less
information about sex offenders, since without SORNLs more sex offenders would
actually be convicted of sex crimes. Arguably, prosecutors might develop bargaining
policies that will indicate to them what the actual underlying offense pleaded out of was.
For instance, prosecutors in California in the 1960s who used Section 650½ of the
California Penal Code as an offense to plead out of registration requirements, were aware
of the special nature of a conviction under this section. 194 Nevertheless, this type of
policy is more indicative of the existence of a problem then it is of the fact that it can be
solved. Such policies are by their very nature local. At best, in the 1960s only California
prosecutors might have been aware of the special meaning of a conviction under Section
650½. Second, this behavior might have a detrimental effect on the rehabilitation of sex
offenders. Rehabilitation in general requires that offenders acknowledge the acts they
have committed, and atone for them as part of an educational process. 195 This process is
of specific importance in the treatment of sex offenders, 196 who tend to live in denial as to
the wrongfulness of their acts. 197 Pleading sex offenders to nonsexual crimes, however,
might exacerbate the denial of sex offenders, and this, in turn, might lower the severity of

192

Bill Braun, State Firm in Registration of Sex Offenders, TULSA W ORLD, Sept. 22, 2002, at A15. See also
Simon, supra note 127 at 301 (describing the case of Richard Allen Davis, a repeat sex offender from
California who managed to avoid registration by pleading to nonsexual offenses).
193
Sandy Hodson, Convict Must Join Registry for Sex Crime, A UGUSTA CHRONICLE, Feb. 5, 2003, at A1.
194

See E. A. Riddle, Compulsory Registration: A Vehicle of Mercy Discarded, 3 W. CAL. L. REV. 195, 198
n18 (1967) (quoting an interview with members of the San Diego City Attorney’s staff).
195

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure: The Case
of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. RE V. 1361, 1390 (2003) (noting that “punishment
reforms and deters in part by educating the offender and society”); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as
Atonement, 46 UCLA L. RE V. 1801, 1804-29 (1999) (presenting a theory of punishment based on
atonement); R. A. Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 254-62 (1986) (presenting a theory as to the role of
penance and reconciliation within a punitive system).
196

See, e.g., Bibas, id. at 1395-6 (noting the importance of admitting wrongdoing in the treatment of sex
offenders); Stefan J. Padfield, Self-Incrimination and Acceptance of Responsibility in Prison Sex Offender
Treatment Programs, 49 U. KAN. L. RE V. 487, 497-8 (2001) (noting that acceptance of responsibility is a
key part in the treatment of sex offenders); Judith V. Becker, The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk
Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention, 4 P SYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 116, 128 (1998) (noting that within
the cognitive therapy approach to treating sex offenders, the most accepted method used at the time,
treatment focuses on eliminating offender’s denial).
197

Bibas, id. at 1393-4 and references made in note 159.
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the act in the eyes of offenders. 198 Hence, quite ironically, SORNLs might cause a rise in
recidivism rates. 199
***
In conclusion, in this Section I have argued that SORNLs should be viewed as a
punitive tool. Furthermore, I have argued that using SORNLs in order to sanction sex
offenders might be justified on economic grounds. Nonetheless, the Section did point out
some of the problems that might be associated with using SORNLs as a punitive tool.

IV.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this Section I will turn to evaluate the policy implications of the punitive
approach towards SORNLs with respect to five topics: the retroactive application of
SORNLs, the legal limitations on the use of SORNLs as punishment, the rights of sex
offenders to a risk assessment hearing prior to public notification, the reintegration of sex
offenders, and the plea bargaining behavior created by SORNLs. Generally, the
discussion in this Section will focus on notification, and not the registration aspects of
SORNLs. This limitation is made since the focus of this Article is on the nonlegal
sanctions triggered by notification.
1. The Retroactive Application of SORNLs
An area of law that has generated a substantial amount of litigation with respect to
SORNLs is whether these laws violate the ex-post- facto clause of the federal
constitution. 200 The ex-post facto clause applies to four different sets of cases. 201 First,
laws that criminalize an act that was not previously criminal. Second, laws that make the
crime greater than it originally was at the time it was committed. Third, laws that raise
the punishment that was attached to the crime. And finally, laws that change the rules of
evidence in a way that allows for less or different testimony than that that was required at
the time the offense was committed. The argument made by sex offenders falls under the
third option, effectively stating that SORNLs create an additional punishment that is
inflicted retroactively to sex offenders.
The ex-post- facto doctrine aims to serve three main goals. First, it assures
individuals will receive fair warning, allowing them to reasonably rely on the legal

198

NAT ’L. CRIM. JUST . A SS’N STUDY, supra note 145 at 8.

199

Bibas, supra note 195 at 1396-7 (pointing out that denial might result in higher recidivism rates for sex
offenders).
200

U.S. CONST . A RT . I, § 10 (“No State shall…pass any…ex post facto law”).

201

The original categorization was set out in Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390 (U.S. 1798). This
categorization is still used both by courts (see, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-22 (U.S. 2000))
and by commentators (see, e.g., Danielle Kitson, It’s an Ex-Post Fact: Supreme Court Misapplies the ExPost Facto Clause to Criminal Procedure Statutes, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 434 (2001)).
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situation at the time during which they act. 202 Second, it acts as a check on the power of
government. 203 More specifically, it prevents legislatures from imposing vindictive or
arbitrary legislation on unpopular groups or individuals. 204 By doing so, it protects the
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial branches of government. 205
Finally, the court recently recognized an independent fairness interest in having the
government abide by the rules that it created. 206 Given this background, I will view the
ex-post- facto clause as an exogenous moral constraint on a sanctioning regime, which
does not necessarily serve any economic purpose. 207
Ex post facto claims regarding SORNLs have been brewing within the legal
system for a significant amount of time, with courts reaching contradictory results. At the
state level, several Supreme Courts reached conflicting conclusions as to the
constitutionality of the retroactive provisions of their state’s SORNL. 208 Similarly, federal
circuit courts reached conflicting outcomes on the issue. 209 This difference of opinion set
the ground for the Supreme Court to take the matter under consideration. 210

202

See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-9 (U.S.Fla. 1981); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-30
(U.S.Fla. 1987).
203

See, e.g., Weaver, id. at 29; Miller, id.

204

See Weaver, id; Calder 3 U.S. at 390.

205

See Weaver, id. at 29 n10; Calder, id. at 389.

206

See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533.

207

From the view point of economic analysis, the ex-post-facto doctrine is quite puzzling. The ex-post facto
doctrine applies to legislative increases in the penalty. Yet from an economic perspective the crucial point
from the viewpoint of potential criminals is not the magnitude of the sanction but rather the size of the
expected sanction. Under this analysis potential criminals rely both on the size of the sanction set out by the
legislature and on the probability of detection set out by enforcement agencies. For example, when the IRS
raised the rate of audits from 1 to 2 percent in 1995 (see Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, TAXING OURSELVES
152 (1st ed., 1996)) it did not raise the actual sanction inflicted to tax evaders, but it did double the expected
sanction. Thus, under the economic model of crime we would expect to find a limitation on retroactive
increases in the probability of detection as well. Nevertheless, the ex-post facto doctrine does not apply to
such increases. Under American law the government has complete discretion to change that probability
even in the extreme case in which it completely stopped enforcing a specific law. See District of Columbia
v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (U.S. 1953) (holding that “[t]he failure of the executive branch to
enforce a law does not result in its modification or repeal”).
208

See, e.g., Kansas v. Meyers, 923 P.2d 1024. (striking down the Kansas notification provision); Olivieri
v. Louisiana, 779 So.2d 735, 749-50 (La. 2001) (upholding the Louisiana notification provision); State v.
Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404 (Ohio, 1998) (upholding the Ohio notification provision).
209

See, e.g., E.B. v. Poritz, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (upholding the New Jersey notification
provision); Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking down the Alaska SORNL).
210

Otte v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1126 (U.S. 2002) (granting cert).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

43

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 26 [2004]
SEX, SHAME , AND THE LAW

43

In Smith v. Doe 211 the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act, 212 which is applied to sex offenders retroactively. 213 The
Alaska Act is not much different from SORNLs of other states. It includes a detailed
registration scheme, 214 and sets the ground for Internet based notification. 215 In its
opinion, the Court followed its ruling in Kansas v. Hendricks, 216 according to which the
key distinction is between civil regulations that do not violate the ex-post- facto clause,
and punishments that do violate the clause. 217 To distinguish between the two the Court
used a two-stage test. 218 If the legislature intended the legislation to be punitive, that ends
the analysis, and the law is punitive and unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the
legislature did not have a punitive intent, the court must find that the actual effects of the
law are so punitive that they negate any civil intent of the legislature in order to invalidate
the law.
As to the first part of the Hendricks evaluation, the Smith Court found two
indications to the non-punitive intent underlying the Alaska Act. First, the Alaska
legislature’s express comments stated a civil objective. 219 Second, the Alaska Act does
not offer any procedural safeguards that are normally associated with the criminal
process. 220 Given these findings, the Court reached the conclusion that “the intent of the
Alaska Legislature was to create a civil, non-punitive regime.”221 Having reached this
211

538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003).

212

A LASKA STAT . §§ 12.63; 18.65.087 (hereinafter: the Alaska Act).

213

Smith, 538 U.S. at 90.

214

The Alaska Act requires all sex offenders present in Alaska to register with the department of correction
(if they are incarcerated), or at an Alaska state trooper post or municipal police department (if they are not
incarcerated) (A LASKA STAT . §§ 12.63.010 (a), (b)). Sex offenders must provide the state with details such
as name, aliases, address, anticipated addresses, place of employment, date of birth, driver’s license
number, information regarding cars the sex offender might have access to, and identifying features
(A LASKA STAT . § 12.63.010 (b)(1)). Furthermore, the Alaska Act requires offenders to allow authorities to
photograph and fingerprint them (A LASKA STAT . § 12.63.010 (b)(2)).
215

With respect to notification, the Alaska Act requires the Alaska department of public safety to create a
central registry of sex offenders (A LASKA STAT . § 18.65.087 (a)). The registry makes available to the
public information such as the offender’s name, aliases, address, photograph, description, car information,
and conviction information (A LASKA STAT . § 18.65.087 (b)). Alaska chose to use the Internet as the means
by which this information is disseminated to the public (see http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/).
216

521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997).

217

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.

218

Id.

219

Id. at 93.

220

Id. at 96.

221

Id. In addition the Court dealt with two possible objections to its conclusion. First, the Court dealt with
the fact that the part of the act dealing with registration was codified within the Alaska Criminal Procedure
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conclusion, the Court turned to evaluate whether the actual effects of the Alaska Act may
negate the legislatures’ intent. In its effect analysis the Court employed five of the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors that it found most relevant to the issue. 222 The Court
distinguished the Alaska Act from historical shaming sanctions by pointing out that the
program created by it does not display offenders in public for ridicule and shaming. 223
The Court continued and brushed aside the arguments made as to the employment and
housing effects of the Alaska Act as mere “conjecture”. 224 Finally, the Court found that
the Alaska Act is not excessive, given the high recidivism rates among sex offenders and
the importance of the goal of promoting public safety. 225 Thus, the Court concluded that
the Alaska Act was non-punitive, and could be applied retroactively. 226
Since its publication, the Smith ruling has drawn criticism from legal
scholars. 227 This criticism has mainly focused on the displeasure from the outcome of the
case, while not providing a comprehensive theoretical argument that would explain its

Code. Under Hendricks, the placement of an act within the state code may indicate the legislative intent
underlying the act. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that the Alaska
Criminal Procedure Code contains several provisions that do not involve criminal punishment and thus the
inclusion of the Alaska Act in it does not indicate that the legislative intent underlying the act was
necessarily punitive. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-5. In addition the Court did not make much of the fact that
following the adoption of the Alaska Act the state amended its Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring
courts to inform the defendant in writing as to the potential registration requirements, see A LASKA RULE
CRIM. PROC. § 11(c)(4), and to incorporate the registration requirements into the written judgments of
offenders, see A LASKA STAT . § 12.55.148(a). The Court found that these facts were not indicatory of the
legislative intent in this case since informing individuals of adverse effects of convictions is consistent with
both civil and criminal policies. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 95-6.
222

Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The factors that the Court found to be most relevant to its analysis were whether
the regulatory scheme: “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to
a non-punitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose”.
223

Id. at 98-9. It should be noted that even within its analysis of the effects of the Alaska Act the Court
continued to stress the importance of legislative intent. Thus, when the court distinguished between
colonial shaming sanctions and the Alaska Act it found that “[i]n contrast to the colonial shaming
punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the
objective of the regulatory scheme”. Id. (emphasis added). The Court then continued and noted “the
purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate
the offender”. Id. (emphasis added).
224

Id. at 100.

225

Id. at 102-3.

226

Id. at 105-6.

227

See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, supra note 165 at 334-9 (crit ically evaluating
the court’s opinion in Smith). But see Kimberly B. Willkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH L. RE V. 1245, 1277-8 (2003) (viewing SORNLs
as aimed towards protecting the public rather than punishing offenders).
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problems. Thus, I will now turn to analyze the Smith ruling in light of the theoretical
framework regarding nonlegal sanctions presented above. 228
SORNLs represent an intersection between legal and nonlegal sanctions in which
the law causes a specific group of people to be subjected to a series of nonlegal sanctions.
Thus, when courts analyze the legal status of these laws, they should have a theory as to
the nature of nonlegal sanctions in hand. Without such a theory, courts run the risk of
developing a body of law that is not in touch with its real world effects. The underlying
assumption throughout the Court’s analysis of the Alaska Act is that the adverse effects
that offenders incur are preve ntative in nature. For example, the Court finds that “[t]he
State makes the facts underlying the offenses and the resulting convictions accessible so
members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with
the registrant.”229 Other courts that upheld SORNLs against ex-post-facto challenges also
adopted this line of reasoning. 230 Yet this one-dimensional analysis ignores the fact that
nonlegal sanctions are driven by three different forces – preferences, norms, and
prevention. 231 To assume that SORNLs cause only, or even mostly, preventative nonlegal
sanction is problematic. Rather, the evidence presented above demonstrated that SORNLs
cause sex offenders to suffer from nonlegal sanctions that have little to do with
228

In the text I shall focus my critic of Smith on its treatment of nonlegal sanctions as a social phenomenon.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the opinion of the Court in Smith raises other difficulties. The Court’s
overwhelming reliance on legislative intent as the touchstone for judicial constitutional scrutiny is
undesirable for several reasons. First, the use of legislative intent in a federal context such as that of
SORNLs could create inconsistencies among different jurisdictions. In effect, the Smith opinion deals
exclusively with the question of the constitutionality of the Alaska Act. Under the holding an identical law
adopted by another state that does have a punitive intent will be deemed unconstitutional. Constitutional
doctrine does not necessarily have to aim towards consistency. However, in the context of setting out a
fairness constraint to a criminal justice system it would seem that creating uniform outcomes is desirable.
In addition, the ex-post-facto doctrine is aimed at limiting the power of legislatures. Thus, legal doctrine
should be tailored to deal with a legislature that wishes to abuse its power. Under this premise the
evaluation of legislative intent through mechanical instruments such as the stated intent of the legislature
and the place in which the statute was codified, would only set out a road map for legislatures to immunize
legislation from ex-post-facto review. For a general argument for focusing on the effect of SORNLs rather
then the underlying legislative intent see Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled
Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1725-8 (1996).
Another problem with the Smith ruling has to do with the fact that the Court based its conclusion
of a non-punitive intent in part on a lack of procedural safeguards in the Alaska Act. This type of reasoning
is, at best, problematic. Holding a law constitutional because it does not offer defendants rights and
protections only gives legislatures incentives not to grant defendants such rights in future cases. It is
unclear why courts would want to give legislatures this type of incentives.
229

Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.

230

E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099-1100 (noting that the dissemination of accurate information when done in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest cannot be considered to be punishment); Femedeer v.
Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that dissemination of information about criminal activity
“has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest”);
Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the dissemination of information
should not be viewed as punishment).
231

See supra Section II 1.
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prevention and have much more to do with reciprocity and a norm of sanctioning. 232
Justice Souter, while not using the signaling terminology employed here, understood the
social process that might be triggered by creating a focal point surrounding sex offenders,
when he noted that:
While the Court accepts the State's explanation that the Act simply makes
public information available in a new way, the scheme does much more.
Its point, after all, is to send a message that probably would not otherwise
be heard, by selecting some conviction information out of its corpus of
penal records and broadcasting it with a warning. Selection makes a
statement, one that affects common reputation and sometimes carries
harsher consequences, such as exclusion from jobs or housing,
harassment, and physical harm. 233
Regretfully, the Court did not incorporate this insight into its holding in Smith, and based
its ruling on a misconception of the nonlegal sanctions created by SORNLs. 234
Finally, it should be noted that the ruling of the Court in Smith is not aligned with
the general approach courts have taken towards disseminating truthful information about
past criminal activities. State courts have been dealing for a long period of time with
probation conditions that include an element of public notification. Generally, states
allow judges to set probation conditions that promote the rehabilitation of offenders and
the safety of the community, but forbid them from imposing additional punitive
measures. 235 In some jurisdictions proactive judges have tried to use this authority to
impose conditions that disseminated to the public information about the crimes
committed by offenders. Yet, offenders subjected to such conditions have argued
successfully that these conditions are punitive, and therefore are beyo nd the scope of the
court’s authority while setting probation conditions.

232

See supra Section III 3.
Smith, 538 U.S. 109 (Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, internal citation omitted). For a similar
view see Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995 (Or. 1998) (noting that a
sex offender has a liberty interest “in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has
singled you out for special attention”).
233

234

Interestingly, a few weeks after releasing its decision in Smith the Supreme Court released its decision in
Lawrence, which struck down sodomy laws. One of the points made by the Court in Lawrence was that
adults engaged in consensual acts of sodomy might be subjected to the adverse affects of SORNLs in at
least four states. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2482. Clearly, if SORNLs only cause reactions that can be
associated with precautions the courts’ concern is unfounded. Members of communities into which such
offenders will move into will understand that they pose no risk, and will not subject them to any kind of
undes ired treatment. Nevertheless, as the court intuitively realizes, inclusion in a sex offender registry has
far more implications.
235

For example, in Montana the authority of judges to impose conditions at sentencing is limited to those
conditions that are “necessary to obtain the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and
society”. 46-18-202(1), MCA (2003).
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For example, in Montana v. Mohammad236 the offender was required by the
District Court judge to post on every entrance a sign stating “CHILDREN UNDER THE
AGE OF 18 ARE NOT ALLOWED BY COURT ORDER.” 237 Recognizing the potential
devastating effect such a sign might have on the life of the offender, the Montana
Supreme Court found that it was punitive, and therefore outside of the authority of the
district court. 238 This line of reasoning was also followed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in State v. Burdin. 239 In Burdin the Court evaluated a probation condition that was
imposed on a defendant who was convicted of sexual battery of a 16-year-old victim. The
condition required the defendant to place in the front yard his residence a four-by-eight
foot sign with black letters over a yellow background stating: “Warning, all children.
Wayne Burdin is an admitted and convicted child molester. Parents beware.”240 The
Burdin Court found that under Tennessee law the primary goal of probation conditions is
rehabilitation, and courts cannot impose additional punishments that are beyond that
goal. 241 Thus, the court ruled that the district court was unauthorized to set the condition
described above. 242 Generally, the Muhammad and Burdin rulings reflect the majority
view among courts on this issue. 243 Furthermore, even states that did find these measures
to be lawful did so while acknowledging their punitive nature. For instance, in Lindsay v.
State244 the Florida district court of appeals evaluated the legality of a probation condition
236

309 Mont. 1 (Mont. 2002).

237

Id. at 4. This sing is not equivalent to the regime created by SORNLs since on one hand it does not
explicitly identify the released offender as a sex offender, while it informs people of a court order rather
than a past offense. Furthermore, unlike SORNLs that are mostly based on Internet notification this case
involves physical signs. Nevertheless, one can assume that the actual effects of this sign was quite similar
to that of SORNLs since its inevitable outcome was to inform the neighbors of the offender about his past
sex crimes.
238

Id. at 12 (noting that the condition is “unduly severe and punitive to the point of being unrelated to
rehabilitation…the effect of such a scarlet letter condition tend to overshadow any possible rehabilitative
potential that it may generate”).
239

924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn.1996).

240

Id. at 84.

241

Id. at 87.

242

Id.

243

See Muhammad 309 Mont. at 12 (noting that the opinion of the court reflects the opinion of most
jurisdictions). For additional examples of such rulings see, e.g., People v. Meyer 176 Ill. 2d 372 (Ill. 1997)
(Illinois Supreme Court held that a probation condition requiring a violent felon to post a 4- foot by 8-foot
warning sign that will state with 8-inch high letters “VIOLENT FELON” at each entrance to his property is
an unreasonable form of shaming); People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259 (N.Y. 1995) (New-York Court of
Appeals holding that a probation condition requiring defendant to affix to any car he drove two signs which
state in fluorescent, large block letters “CONVICTED DWI” is an unauthorized form of punishment). But
see Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga.App. 627, 629 (Ga.App. 1993) (upholding a probation condition that
required the defendant to wear a pink fluorescent bracelet imprinted with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT”).
244

606 So.2d 652 (Fla. App. 1992).

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art26

48

Teichman:

48

SEX, SHAME , AND THE LAW

that required a defendant to place an ad regarding his DUI conviction in a local
newspaper. 245 The Lindsay Court noted that Florida law allows judges to impose punitive
probation conditions. 246 Thus, the court found that despite the fact that the condition was
punitive, it was valid under Florida law. 247
While one might argue that these cases deal with sanctions that are harsher than
those created by SORNLs, it would seem that the main point of these measures continues
to be the dissemination of truthful information regarding past criminal activity. Unlike
the Smith Court, the rulings reviewed above simply acknowledged the humiliating nature
of public notification, and its resemblance to historical forms of punishment. 248
In sum, applying the punitive approach towards SORNLs leads to the conclusion
that these laws should not be applied retroactively. Withholding the application of these
laws to a well-defined group of offenders, who committed their crimes prior to the
enactment of these laws, seems to be a small price to pay in order to sustain the moral
constraint of the ex post facto clause. 249
2. Substantive Limitations on the Use of SORNLs as a Sanctioning Tool
A second line of arguments brought forward by sex offenders against SORNLs
challenges their general validity rather than their validity towards a specific group of
offenders. The two main arguments made in this context are that SORNLs represent an
unconstitutional deprivation of privacy, and that they are a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. I will begin by evaluating offenders’ privacy claims.

245
246

Id. at 654.
Id. at 656.

247

Id. (noting that “the idea that this condition of probation is improper simply because it is punitive is
belied by both the statute and the cases”).
248

See Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 382 (“The sign contains a strong element of public humiliation or ridicule
because it serves as a formal, public announcement of the defendant’s crime”); Muhammad, 309 Mont. at
12 (viewing a notification condition as a “scarlet letter condition”); Letterlough, 86 N.Y. 2d at 266 (“public
disclosure of a person's crime, and the attendant humiliation and public disgrace, has historically been
regarded strictly as a form of punishment”).
249

The distinction between punitive and preventative measures presented in this subsection can also be
applied to legal sanctions created by SORNLs. Some SORNLs include legal limitations on the lives of sex
offenders such as barring offenders from working in schools and childcare facilities (see M INN. STAT . §§
2444.052(sub.3)(k), (sub.4) (1999); OKLA. ST . ANN. § 589 (prohibiting offenders from working in business
that provide service to children and schools); A LA CODE § 15-20-26(a) (prohibiting offenders from working
within 2,000 feet of a school or a child care facility)), or limiting the places in which offenders may reside
(see M INN. STAT . ANN. § 244.052 (subd 4a) (b) (prohibiting property owners from knowingly renting a
room to level three sex offenders if that owner has an agreement with an agency that provides shelter to
victims of domestic abuse); OKLA. ST . A NN. § 590 (prohibiting offenders from residing within a two
thousand foot radius of any school or educational institution); A LA CODE § 15-20-26 (establishing a list of
limitations on the places in which sex offenders may reside)). Such limitation should not pose any serious
problem from an ex post facto perspective as long as they are tailored in a narrow way that reflects the type
preventative reactions that the Court assumes in Smith.
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Generally, offenders have been unsuccessful bringing forward claims based on
the privacy argument. The third, sixth, and ninth circuits have all dealt to some extent
with privacy arguments made with respect to SORNLs, and all chose to reject them. 250 Of
these cases it would seem that the line of cases rising out of the third circuit requires an
extended evaluation, given that it offers the most extensive analysis of offenders’ privacy
claims thus far. Paul I and Paul II deal with the pre-Internet notification era. The
plaintiffs in Paul I were classified as tier 2 and tier 3 sex offenders. 251 As such, under
New Jersey law at the time, they were subjected to public notification. 252 In dealing with
the privacy argument made by the plaintiffs, the Court first found that there is no privacy
limitation regarding notifying the public of offenders’ criminal records. 253 Nevertheless,
the Court did find that offenders have some nontrivial privacy interest in preventing the
publication of their home address. 254 Having found this privacy interest, the Court still
rejected the offenders’ privacy claim due to the compelling governmental interest in
preventing future sex crimes. 255 The Court did, however, remand the case to the District
Court to determine whether the law in question was applied in such a way that assures
that the information was disclosed only to parties who have a particular need for it. 256
This later issue was eve ntually disposed of in Paul II, in which the Court held that New
Jersey’s guidelines for the implementation of its SORNL limited notification to those
individuals who had a need for the information, and therefore did not violate offenders’
privacy rights. 257
Given the court’s decisions in Paul I and Paul II, which upheld notification based
on its limited application, offenders embarked on a new challenge against New Jersey’s
SORNL once it shifted to wide ranged Internet notification. Yet in A.A. ex rel. M.M. v.
New Jersey 258 this challenge met an unsympathetic court. In its decision in A.A. the Court
emphasized the importance of wide dissemination of information to the general public in
order to prevent future crimes, 259 and ruled that the state’s interest in expanding
notification outweighed any privacy interest of offenders.260
250

See Paul v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir.1999) (upholding the New Jersey SORNL against privacy
challenges) [hereinafter: Paul I]; Paul v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2000) (same) [hereinafter: Paul II];
A.A. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 480-2 (rejecting privacy
arguments made against the Tennessee SORNL); Russell v. Gregorie, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093-4 (9th
Cir.1997) (rejecting privacy claims with respect to Washington’s SORNL). But see Doe v. Otte, 248 F. 3d
832, 850 note 18 (2001) (limiting the scope of Russell).
251

Paul I, 170 F.3d at 399.

252

Id.

253

Id. at 403.

254

Id. at 404.

255

Id.

256

Id. at 406.

257

Paul II, 227 F.3d at 107.

258

341 F.3d 206 (N.J. 2003).
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Several commentators have criticized the rulings rejecting the privacy arguments
made by sex offenders. 261 Generally, these commentators argue that sex offenders, like
any other type of offender, have a reasonable expectation to keep their criminal past
private so they can embark on a new life upon release from prison. 262 Furthermore, these
commentators point out the unclear success of SORNLs in preventing future crimes. 263
Thus, they argue that in balancing between sex offender’s privacy rights and the states’
interest in preventing future crimes the former should prevail. 264
The punitive approach towards SORNLs points out that the debate surrounding
offender’s privacy rights should take a different direction. Rather than focusing on the
appropriate balance between offenders’ privacy rights and the states’ interest in crime
prevention, we should focus on the question to what extent may states infringe on
offenders’ privacy rights in order to punish them. Once the debate is framed in such a
manner, the rulings upholding SORNLs against privacy challenges seem to be justifiable.
The public has a strong interest in punishing sex offenders that includes fulfilling a
societal need for reciprocity and deterring future crimes. Thus, while there might be a
limitation on the ability of states to strip individuals of their privacy in order to punish
them, given the importance of punishing sex offenders it would seem reasonable to
conclude that the interest SORNLs serve outweighs the privacy interests of offenders.
Despite the fact that adopting the punitive approach towards SORNLs seems to
lead to the same conclusion courts have reached, adopting it is of importance for two
reasons. First, in order to uphold SORNLs some courts are willing to read privacy rights
in a narrow way, finding that sex offender’s privacy rights were never violated by
SORNLs. 265 Such a finding is troublesome. The dramatic lowering of search costs for the
public, coupled with the computation of information that includes offender’s home
address does represent an invasion of the most private space of sex offenders, and should
be viewed as an invasion of privacy. Second, courts willing to recognize a privacy
259

Id. at 212.

260

Id. at 213. Interestingly, the Court in A.A. cited in this context the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith,
which had nothing to do with the question whether SORNLs violate a constitutional right to privacy (id.).
This might indicate the fact that the Smith ruling has far wider implications than its limited content and that
it will serve as a general authority to reject claims made by sex offenders.
261

See, e.g., Tara L. Wayt, Megan’s Law: A Violation of the Right to Privacy, 6 TEMP . POL. & CIV. RTS L.
REV. 139, 149-153 (1997) (arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court misapplied the right to privacy in
Poritz); Lewis, supra note 8 at 96-102 (arguing that SORNLs may be unconstitutional on privacy grounds);
Houston, supra note 36 at 762-4 (arguing that public notification with respect to sex offenders that do not
pose a serious risk might be unconstitutional).
262

Lewis, id. at 96-7.

263

Id. at 100-2.

264

Id.

265

See, e.g., Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 480; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1093-4.
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interest are engaging in a rather limited evaluation of the public interest that supposedly
justifies the limitation of that interest, and accept as a given that SORNLs are a key
component in preventing future sex crimes. 266 Yet due to the dramatic effects of SORNLs
on the privacy of offenders and their questionable preventative value, 267 one would
expect a far more rigorous evaluation of the public interest invoked to justify them.
A second argument sex offenders raise challenging the validity of SORNLs is that
these laws are unconstitutiona l since they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 268
Similar arguments are made by legal scholars, who tend to focus their attention on the
vigilante attacks caused by SORNLs. 269 Thus far since the majority of courts have found
that SORNLs do not constitut e punishment, they have also rejected claims that SORNLs
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 270 From the perspective of the punitive
approach towards SORNLs the conclusion that these laws are generally not cruel and
unusual punishment is desirable. Despite the harsh effects SORNLs bring on offenders
there seems to be no reason to view these punitive effects as exceptionally cruel,
especially when compared to the alternative sanction, namely, imprisonment. 271
To be sure, there might be specific types of public shaming that could be viewed
as cruel and unusual punishment since they contradict the common moral values of

266

See, e.g., A.A., 341 F.3d at 211-13 (recognizing “the State's interest in expanding the reach of its
notification to protect additional members of the public”).
267

See supra Section III 2.

268

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bails shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted”. See U.S. CONST . Amend. VIII.
269

See, e.g., Andrea L. Fischer, Florida’s Community Notification of Sex Offenders on the Internet: The
Disregard of Constitutional Protection to Sex Offenders, 45 CLEV. ST . L. RE V. 505, 523-30 (1997); Bedarf,
supra note 53 at 936-9 (arguing that SORNLs constitute cruel and unusual punishment because they
degrading); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. L.
REV. 788, 820-6 (1996) (arguing that SORNLs constitute cruel and unusual punishment because vigilante
acts are a foreseeable result of such laws); G. Scott Rafshoon, Community Notification of Sex Offenders:
Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMROY L. J. 1633, 1668-71 (1995) (same). But see
Houston, supra note 36 at 747-756 (arguing that SORNLs are a legitimate way to promote public safety
and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
270

See, e.g., Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 477. But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (finding that requiring
a defendant convicted of soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct to register as a sex offender constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment under the California Constitution). Recently, the California Supreme Court
overruled Reed in In re Leon Casey Alva, 92 P.3d 311 (Cal. 2004). Yet one should note that the discussion
in Alva was limited to the question wheather registration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
313. Thus, it is still not clear wheather the enactment of a widespread notification program will be
constitutional under California law.
271

See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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society. 272 Such values are based on a variety of political theories, such as human dignity
or the disutility caused to the general public by the humiliation of a fellow member of the
community. For instance, one might argue that the provisions of the Louisiana SORNL
authorizing courts to order offenders to wear t-shirts and post signs outside their homes
that indicate their status as sex offenders represent a type of humiliation that is
unacceptable. Evaluating exactly which types of notification should be viewed as
unacceptable should therefore be done on a case by case basis, and is beyond the scope of
this Article.
In sum, the punitive approach towards SORNLs might be bad news for offenders
as to the viability of their arguments relating to the general validity of these laws, since it
sees nothing inherently wrong with publicly shaming people in order to punish them.
Nevertheless, adopting this approach could be good news for those who wish to protect
individual rights, since it does recognize the harsh effects of these laws.
3. Procedural Due Process: The Right of Sex Offenders to Risk Assessment
Hearings Prior to Public Notification
A common argument raised by sex offenders is that automatic registration and
notification without a prior individual evaluation of the risk of recidivism violates
offenders’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 273 According to this
argument, the harsh reputational effects of notification, coupled with the burden of
registration, constitute a liberty interest that requires legislatures to give offenders a
chance to demonstrate that they represent a low risk of re-offending. As a matter of
existing law, the Jacob Wetterling Act does not require individual risk assessments, and
states differ on this issue. 274
Courts have been divided in their treatment of offenders’ due process claims.
While the majority of courts, at both the state and the federal level, have rejected these
claims, 275 several influential decisions have found that SORNLs - and especially the ir
notification provisions - infringe on a liberty interest of offenders, and require a holding

272

Courts have generally held that the Eighth Amendment creates a moral limitation on the types of
punis hments that can be used. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (U.S. 1958) (noting that the basic
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment is human dignity); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378
(U.S. 1910) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice”).
273

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, §1.
274

See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.

275

See, e.g., Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 478-80 (Sixth Circuit upholding Tennessee SORNL against a due
process challenge); Milks v. State, 848 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (Florida appellate court upholding
state’s SORNL against a due process challenge); State v. Wilkinson, 9 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2000) (The Kansas
Supreme Court upholding the state’s SORNL against a due process challenge); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591
N.W.2d 711, 718-9 (Minn. 1999) (The Minnesota Supreme Court upholding the state’s SORNL against a
due process challenge).
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of a risk assessment hearing. 276 At the same time, a vibrant academic debate has evolved
on this question. 277 Given the divergence of opinions on the matter, including the
difference of opinion between the Second and the Sixth Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal, 278 the Supreme Court recently took the matter under consideration. 279
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Smith it also
handed down its ruling in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.280 In this
ruling, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the Connecticut SORNL against a
procedural due process challenge. The Connecticut SORNL applies to all individuals
convicted of several sex crimes and crimes against minors, 281 while generally making no
distinctions among different offenders according to their potential risk of re-offending. 282
Given this policy, the Respondent, Doe, argued that since he does not pose a high risk of
re-offending, the Connecticut SORNL deprives him of a liberty interest – his reputation –
by including his name in a sex offender registry without granting him meaningful
opportunity to be heard. 283
276

See, e.g., Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Second Circuit
striking down Connecticut’s SORNL on due process grounds); State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255 (Hawai'i, 2001)
(The Supreme Court of Hawaii finding that the state’s SORNL violates the state’s due process clause);
Espindola v. State, 885 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 2003) (Florida appellate court striking down the state’s SORNL
on due process grounds). In New Jersey the Supreme Court also found that the states SORNL violated
offenders’ due process rights. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 417-22 (N.J.1995). In order to uphold the
law the Court then read into the law a requirement for a judicial hearing (id. at 381-5).
277

See, e.g., Jennifer G. Daugherty, Sex Offender Registration Laws and Procedural Due Process: Why
Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee Should be Overturned, 26 HAMLINE L. RE V. 713 (2003)
(arguing that SORNLs should not be struck down on due process grounds); Logan, supra note 164 at 1167
(arguing that sex offenders’ due process rights should be guarded); Small, supra note 8 at 1451 (concluding
that an individual fact specific risk evaluation should be conducted with respect to each offender);
Rafshoon, supra note 269 at 1671-3 (arguing that offenders subjected to notification should be provided
with a hearing).
278

Compare Doe, 271 F.3d 38 with Cutshall, 193 F.3d 466.

279

535 U.S. 1077 (U.S. 2002) (granting cert).

280

538 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003).

281

CONN. STAT . §§ 54-251; 54-252. The Connecticut SORNL also applies to felonies committed for a
sexual purpose (CONN. STAT . § 54-254), yet Connecticut courts have full discretion regarding the
application of the SORNL to offenders who were convicted of such felonies.
282

The Connecticut SORNL does make some distinctions among offenders. With respect to the length of
its application the Connecticut SORNL applies to most offenders for a period of ten years, while those
convicted of sexually violent offenses must register for life (CONN. STAT . §§ 54-251; 54-252). In addition,
some very specific types of offenders may be exempt by a court from the requirements of the SORNL. For
example, an offender convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor aged between 13 and 16 while the
offender was no more than two years older than the minor, and provided that the offender was younger than
19, may be exempt from the requirements of the law if a court finds that registration is not required for the
protection of the public’s safety (CONN. STAT . § 54-251(c)).
283

Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 5-6.
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In a brief ruling, with no dissenting voices, the Court upheld the Connecticut
SORNL. The Court opened its analysis by pointing out that “sex offenders are a serious
threat” and that they are “much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sex assault.”284 Having said that, the Court turned to find that
the Connecticut SORNL does not deprive registrants of their due process rights since the
sole touchstone for registration under it was prior convictions, and it did not categorize
all sex offenders as dangerous. 285 Furthermore, as noted by the Court, the notification
website operated by the state explicitly stated that the Connecticut Department of Public
Safety “has made no determination that any individual included in the registry is
currently dangerous.”286 Thus, since the issue of an individual’s dangerousness is not a
relevant factor according to the Connecticut SORNL, there is no reason to conduct any
kind of hearing prior to registration. 287
As was the case with respect to Smith, the unwillingness of the Court in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety to face the reality brought about by SORNLs
leads it to a problematic decision. The Court ignores the fact that the mere inclusion in a
sex offender registry creates detrimental effects on the reputation of these individuals. As
we have seen, the reaction of communities to inclusion in registries goes beyond taking
preventative measures based on the dangerousness of offenders, and reflects punitive acts
that are based on the status of sex offenders as such. 288
The punitive approach towards SORNLs offers a far more consistent and
persuasive view on the issue of offenders’ right to a risk assessment hearing. This
approach recognizes the stigmatizing effect of including individuals in a sex offender
registry. Nevertheless, since the focal point of this approach is punishing offenders for
their past acts it finds no necessity in evaluating the future dangerousness of a specific
offender. Rather, the only relevant hearing from this perspective is the sentencing hearing
of the offender after he was found guilty. 289
Again, as was the case with respect to offender’s substantive due process
arguments, the punitive approach towards SORNLs does not reflect much optimism as to
the viability of the procedural arguments brought forward by offenders. Adopting this
approach, however, is of importance since unlike the Court’s reasoning in Connecticut
284

Id. at 4 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002)).
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Id. at 7-8.
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Id. at 8.
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Id.
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See supra Section III 3.
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In fact, at least one court has explicitly followed this line of reasoning. See Wilkinson, 9 P.3d at 8
(noting that “the only procedural due process to which Wilkinson was entitled was the process required to
convict him of the underlying offenses which triggered this non-cruel, non-arbitrary aspect of his
‘punishment’”).
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Department of Public Safety, it does acknowledge the actual effects of SORNLs.
SORNLs do represent the awesome power the state holds in stigmatizing a specific group
of people, and its use of this power should be limited by procedural safeguards. 290
4. Reintegrating Sex Offenders
As we have seen above, shame sanctions in gene ral, and SORNLs in particular,
might have the perverse effect of increasing the crime rate of the shamed group.291
Legislatures who accept this result as a given, must evaluate the advantages of creating
an efficient regime of general deterrence and the problems of increased criminality
among a specific group. One might conjecture that the benefits of general deterrence are
far reaching, and outweigh any specific deterrence consideration, yet at the end of the day
that is an empirical question. Legislatures, however, should not accept this problem as a
given. Rather, they should aim to design a regime that will inflict painful sanctions while
minimizing the problems associated with shaming. This goal can be achieved by allowing
for the reintegration of offenders into society. In this subsection I will present policy
recommendations that will assist to construct such a regime.
A first point of contention regarding the current state of SORNLs has to do with
the duration of registration and notification. The Jacob Wetterling Act requires offenders
who were convicted of aggravated offences or who were convicted more than once, to
register for life, with no possibility of relief from this requirement. 292 Furthermore, since
the Jacob Wetterling Act only sets out minimum requirements, some states have created
harsher rules, requiring all offenders to register for life with no possibility of relief. 293
This type of sanctioning is undesirable from the perspective of marginal deterrence, since
it condemns offenders to a life of stigmatisation with no possibility of gaining new social
capital. As one offender put it, before he committed suicide, “I have no hope … What is
left for me? I will be subject to Megan’s Law for the rest of my life.”294 A policy
290

It should be noted that the fact the punitive approach towards SORNLs does not require a risk
assessment for offenders does not indicate whether such an evaluation is desirable or not. On one hand,
clearly a central part of the effectiveness of SORNLs as a sanctioning device is the public perception of
high risks that are associated with registered offenders. From that perspective, one might conjecture that
risk assessment hearings are a useful tool to generate higher nonlegal sanctions towards offenders. On the
other hand, conducting such hearings is costly and will eventually lower the amount of people that are
subjected to these laws and thus reduce the use of nonlegal sanctions. Evaluating this tradeoff depends on
empirical data that does not exist at this point in time. Yet in any event one should notice that making this
tradeoff is a legislative matter that should not raise significant constitutional questions.
291

See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text and Section III 4.
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42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B). The Final Guidelines explicitly state that “[a] state is not in compliance
with subsection (b)(6)(B) (i) or (ii) if it has a procedure or authorization for terminating the registration of
convicted offenders within the scope of these provisions at any point in their lifetimes”. See The Final
Guidelines, supra note 103 at 582.
293

See M O. REV. STAT . § 589.400. 3 (setting out lifetime registration for all offenders); S.C. CODE § 23-3460 (same).
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New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra note 143 at 22.
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sensitive to marginal deterrence considerations would allow for the removal of offenders
from the registry after a specified period of time that reflects a socially desired level of
sanctioning, if they have met certain requirements that will motivate them to refrain from
criminal activity, such as having clean police records. 295 Creating a finite registration and
notification period will give offenders something to lose, and will enable policymakers to
utilise nonlegal sanctions to deter future crimes. 296
The case for a finite registration and notification period might be phrased in
constitutional terms. The Court has yet to make a clear connection between the concept
of marginal deterrence and the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, reviewing some of the
cases in which the Court was willing to strike down punishments demonstrates that
marginal deterrence intuitions might be driving at least some of its decisions. This
connection can be seen through the way the Court has read a proportionality requirement
into the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 297 In Coker v.
Georgia,298 for example, the Supreme Court struck down on proportionality grounds a
Georgia law that allowed the imposition of the death penalty on rapists. 299 Though the
court never used marginal deterrence theory in order to explain its ruling, this decision is
in line with such a theory of punishment. Imposing the death penalty on rapists would
give rapists an incentive to kill their victims, since by doing so they would be facing the
same sanction while the probability of detection given the elimination of the (usually)
sole witness to the crime would be reduced. 300 Similarly, some of the concerns of courts
regarding three-strike laws can be framed in terms of marginal deterrence. Under these
laws offenders convicted for the third time of certain crimes are subject to harsh
mandatory sanctions. 301 For instance, In Solem v. Helm, 302 the Court evaluated a life
295

Some states wanted to opt for such a regime. For example, the Florida SORNL provides for judicial
review of the registration requirement twenty years after the initial registration. See FLA. STAT . §
943.0435(11). Yet since this provision subjects itself to the limitations made by the Jacob Wetterling Act
offenders in Florida cannot currently ask for such relief.
296
To be sure, the mere fact that the registration comes to an end will not necessarily bring nonlegal
sanctions to an end since the community will continue to hold the information that was disseminated by the
SORNL. Nevertheless, the moment the law stops to operate the offender does at the very least have an
opportunity to move to a different community in order to start a new life with no nonlegal sanctions.
297

Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (“punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense”).
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433 U.S. 584, 592 (U.S. 1977) (concluding that “a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel
and unusual punishment”).
299

It should be noted that Coker does not represent a complete ban on the imposition of the death penalty
on sexual crimes that do not involve murder. See Louisiana v. Bethley, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996)
(upholding a Louisiana statute allowing the death penalty when the victim of a rape was less than twelve
years of age); cert denied Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (Mem) (U.S. 1997).
300

The assumption of a reduced probability of detection presupposes that law enforcement agencies devote
equal resources to the investigation of rapes that do not involve murder and rapes in which the victim was
murdered. In as much as this is not the case and law enforcement agencies increase their investigation
efforts in murder cases the rapist might still have an incentive to avoid murdering his victim.
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sentence without the possibility of parole imposed on a repeat offender convicted of
issuing a no account check for $100. 303 The Court struck down this punishment, finding
that it was completely disproportionate to the crime. 304 Again, despite the fact that the
Court did not base its decision on marginal deterrence grounds, one can point out a
connection between the theory and the Court’s holding. A sanctioning regime, which
imposes harsh mandatory sanctions for completely different crimes, erodes marginal
deterrence. A two strike offender who faces the same sanction for shoplifting a videotape
and for armed robbery might opt for the later, if his expected payoff from that type of
crime is higher.
Regretfully, in recent years the Court has limited the scope of the Solem ruling to
a degree that one can question the viability of Eighth Amendment challenges to any
incarceration sanction. For instance, in Harmelin v. Michigan the Court upheld a life
sentence without the possibility of parole for a first time offender who was convicted of
possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine. 305 Given the fact that under such a ruling a
state could impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole on sex offenders, it
could also, arguably, require life long registration from such individuals. This trend in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is not necessarily desirable. Punishments that are too
harsh are not in the best interest of society, and courts, at times, should intervene and
regulate overly zealous legislatures creating such punishments.
A second policy recommendation aimed towards the reintegration of sex
offenders is to establish social ceremonies that will reintegrate sex offenders back into
society, while sustaining the shame inflicting aspects of SORNLs. 306 Many cultures that
rely on shame based sanctions utilize such ceremonies. 307 In addition, sophisticated
modern commercial parties that rely on extralegal sanctions often create similar
mechanisms. 308 In the context of sex offenders some states are turning towards adopting
301

For a comparative description of these laws see John Clark, James Austin, and D. Alan Henry, “Three
Strikes and You’re Out”: A Review of State Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Justice, national Institute of Justice,
6-12 (1997).
302
303
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463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Solem, Id. at 281-3.
Id. at 290.
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See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See also Ewing v. California 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
(upholding a California 25 years to life sentence for stealing merchandise valued at approximately $1,200);
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding a California sentence for two consecutive sentences of
25 to life for two cases of petty theft).
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For a general theory of shame and reintegration see Braithwaite, supra note 66 at 54-68.
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See Id. at 74 (describing reintegration ceremonies in Japan); Massaro, supra note 6 at 1924 (pointing out
the importance of reintegration).
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For example, in her case study of the diamond industry Lisa Bernstein points out that one of the possible
sanctions that the board of arbitraries of the Diamond Dealers Club is expulsion from the club. Yet as
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programs of community meetings in which law enforcement officers guide communities
through the process of notification. 309 Such meetings, which arguably do not diminish the
shaming of offenders, might assist the reintegration process of offenders. 310
Finally, legislatures should create legal protections that will assist offenders to
establish new social capital. Laws prohibiting discrimination against sex offenders in
areas such as employment (aside from cases in which such discrimination reflects a
rational preventative measure due to the specific type of work) and housing, might help
achieve this goal. Some legislatures have in fact adopted such measures recently. 311
5. Plea Agreements
As we have seen SORNLs might cause prosecutors and defendants to circumvent
them by using the plea bargaining process. 312 Recently, some legislatures aware of this
behavior have taken steps to prevent it. Upon its enactment in 1991, the Minnesota
SORNL only required that persons convicted of certain enumerated felony offenses
register as sex offenders. 313 Yet in 1993, the legislature amended the statute to require
that a person register if he was charged with a registerable offense, and was convicted of
that offense or “another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances”. 314 Despite
no clear indication as to the legislative intent behind this amendment, it would seem that
it was intended to prevent offenders form pleading out of the registration requirements set
out by the law. 315 The adoption of this amendment is a strong indication that at least in
Minnesota contracting around SORNLs was a common occurrence. 316

Bernstein notes the imposition of such a harsh sanction might create an end game problem. To avoid this
problem the laws governing the diamond trade allow for the readmition of expelled members after a period
of two years. This provision is quite literally a reintegration provision. It gives members a carrot in the
form of potential future membership while giving the Diamond Dealers Club a stick in the form of the
threat to withhold future readmission. See Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 1 at 129.
309

For a description of these meetings see Richard Z. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community
Notification: Examining the Importance of Neighborhood Meetings, 18 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 393 (2000)
(reviewing community meetings in Wisconsin); Matson & Lieb, supra note 149 at 10-14 (reviewing
community meetings in Washington State).
310

Zevitz & Farkas, id. at 405 (noting that community members can assist in the reintegration of offenders
and can help prevent crime).
311

See supra note 55.

312

See supra Section III 5.
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See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1999).

314

M INN. STAT . § 243.166(a)(1).
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Boutin v. LaFleur, 1998 WL 8486 (Minn. App. Jan. 13, 1998) at*2 (noting that the Minnesota
legislature “appears to have intended that offenders such as Boutin not be able to avoid registration as a
predatory offender by plea bargaining for a lesser or different offense”); Gunderson v. Hvass 339 F.3d
639, 643-4 (8th Cir. Minn., 2003) (“ Given the realities of the plea bargaining system, by extending the
registration requirements to persons who are charged with a predatory offense, but who plead guilty to a
non-predatory charge that arises from the same circumstances, the Minnesota legislature was attempting to
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The reactions following the adoption of the Minnesota amendment support the
insights of the theoretical model. Since the amendment does not alter the desire of both
defendants and prosecutors to contract around SORNLs, one can observe that parties are
trying to circumvent the new constraint created by the amendment. One plausible way to
do that is by shifting the negotiations to the pre-charge point, before prosecutors become
committed to triggering the SORNL. Another is by developing procedural loopholes that
will allow the parties to continue with their contracting practices. In Gunderson the
defendant was initially charged with a sex offense, yet after the sexual aspects of the
allegations made by the victim were found to be inconsistent with the findings of the
police investigation, the prosecutor agreed to plea the case to a nonsexual offense. 317 In
what would seem to be an attempt of the prosecutor and the defense attorney to bypass
the Minnesota amendment the two agreed that the initial complaint be dismissed in its
entirety, and that the defendant would plead guilty to a new complaint charging him with
third degree assault. 318 This plan worked initially, but less than a year after sentencing
Gunderson violated his probation. Soon after, he was informed that he would have to
register as a sex offender under the “arising out of the same circumstances” scheme.
Gunderson challenged his registration in federal court, but the court found that the nonregistered offense does not have to be charged in the same complaint as the registerable
offense, only that the conviction arise from the same set of circumstances, and ruled that
Gunderson must register. 319
Undoubtedly, schemes such as the Minnesota amendment can make it more
difficult for prosecutors and defendants to reach plea agreements that circumvent
SORNLs. Nevertheless, such schemes are undesirable for several reasons. First, as the
bargaining model presented above demonstrated, prohibiting such agreements might
actually lower the aggregate sanction sex offenders face. Thus, these schemes might have
the perverse effect of actually lowering deterrence and creating additional crime. Second,
limiting plea bargaining does not deal with the underlying incentives to contract around
SORNLs. Thus, prosecutors and defense attorneys will continue to attempt to develop
loopholes around these limitations, or circumvent them by shifting negotiations to the
pre-charge stage. Third, in some cases such schemes might cause judges to avoid
convicting guilty defendants in order to prevent what they perceive to be an excessive
sanction. Judges and jurors facing a choice between triggering the SORNL by any

insure the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders, including those who take advantage
of favorable plea agreements” (quoting the decision of the magistrate judge in the case)).
316

Other states are also considering amending their SORNL to deal with the issue. According to one report
Maine is considering to allow judges to add to defendant’s records a comment that would indicate the
existence of an accusation of a sex crime, despite the lack of a conviction. See Hench, supra note 186.
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Gunderson, F.3d at 641.
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conviction and acquitting the defendant might see the later as a lesser evil. 320 Hence, such
schemes might reduce the number of defendants found guilty, lower aggregate sanctions,
and limit the information we hold about past criminal acts of sex offenders. Finally, in
some cases the shift to a lesser offense might not be due to negotiation tactics, but
because the case became too difficult, or even impossible, to prove. In Boutin, for
instance, the prosecutors agreed to drop the sexual charges after the victim recanted the
portion of her story in which she alleged the defendant forced her to have sex. 321 From an
optimal deterrence perspective, this might not be a bad outcome, since imposing
sanctions only when defendants’ guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt might create a
problem of under-deterrence. 322 Nevertheless, those who cherish the presumption of
innocence should be concerned about this development. 323
Legislatures who wish to avoid SORNLs being circumvented must realize that no
matter what their intent when they enacted these laws was, defendants view these laws as
sanctions, and that large mandatory sanctions create circumvention problems. Thus, a
more prudent policy would be to grant courts discretion as to the application of the
notification aspects of SORNLs and allow judges to opt out of the notification periods
proscribed by the law. 324 Such a policy would create transparency in the sanctioning
process, would allow prosecutors to maximize the deterrence value of their budgets, and
320

In other cases , judges might try to circumvent the limitation themselves. In Minnesota, for instance,
several Judges have adopted “creative interpretations” of the law in order to avoid what they perceive to be
excessive sanctions. See, e.g., In Matter of Welfare of J.L.M., 1996 WL 380664 (Minn. App. Jul. 9, 1996)
(finding that requiring registration in two cases in which defendants admitted to nonsexual offenses after
being charged with sex offenses is unreasonable and unnecessary and thus exempt defendants from
registration); Matter of Welfare of M.A.R., 558 N.W.2d 274, (Minn. App. 1997) (reversing a district
court’s decision to continue a case without a finding of delinquency beyond the period allowed by law in
order to avoid registration); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996) (staying adjudication and
declining to accept 19 year-old -boy's third-degree criminal sexual conduct guilty plea in order to avoid
registration).
321

Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 713-4. See also Gunderson 339 F.3d at 641 (plea agreement was reached after
sexual allegation were found to be inconsistent with forensic evidence).
322

Keith N. Hylton & V.S. Khanna, Toward an Economic Theory of Criminal
Procedure, Discussion Paper No. 318, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics
and Business, Harvard Law School, at 20-23 (2001, revised 2004) (available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/).
323

Judge Randall of the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently voiced a clear opinion on the matter when he
stated that:
This is a rare occasion in the history of the United States of America! The presumption
of innocence embedded in both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution is
swept aside in favor of a “rule” that says you are “guilty” and must register as a
predatory sex offender simply because you were “charged” with an offense requiring
registration, even though that charge did not stick.
In re Welfare of J.S.K., No. J90150607, 2002 WL 31892086 (Dec. 31, 2002) at*3
(Randall concurring specially).
324

This recommendation follows recommendations made by commentators with respect to mandatory
sanctions. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 87 at 1315-6 (suggesting a reform in federal minimum
sentences);
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would help deal with problematic individual cases. Furthermore, there is little reason for
concern that judges would tend to forgo notification requirements easily since their
decision will be constrained by the fear that an offender that they will release from the
requirement will re-offend.

V.

CONCLUSION

This Article dealt with the question whether policymakers that aim to minimize
the cost of sanctioning should use nonlegal sanctions as a form of punishment. At the
end of the day my answer to this question is yes, they should, but they should be careful
about it. The reason for this word of caution is two fold. First, designing a regime that is
based on legal and nonlegal sanctions requires significant amounts of information with
respect to the way each of these affects the other. Without such prior information,
policymakers cannot be sure as to the final outcomes of their policies. Second, extreme
nonlegal sanctions, like extreme legal sanctions, are a problematic policy tool, and given
the lower budgetary constraint nonlegal sanctions create for policymakers they might be
tempted to create harsh nonlegal sanctions.
More specifically, this Article evaluated the treatment of sex offenders under
public notification laws, and demonstrated that while these programs might have some
preventative value, their main effects are punitive. Thus, it was argued that courts should
overcome their reluctance, and recognize the true nature of these laws. The recent
rulings of the Supreme Court reviewed above, and of other courts that stated explicitly
that they would not take into account the full scope of nonlegal sanctions created by
SORNLs, 325 raise the concern that courts are willing to turn a blind eye towards the
actual effects of legislation.
The conclusions of this Article are tentative in nature for the simple reason that
there is limited empirical data on the issues discussed here. Thus, this Article should not
be viewed as an artic le attempting to seal the debate over the design of optimal
sanctions, but rather as an article that continues this discussion. Additional studies that
could assist to further this discussion include: studies that will offer empirical
measurements of the way the law effects nonlegal sanctions, studies of plea bargaining
behavior surrounding the use of nonlegal sanctions, and studies in specific contexts –
such as the context of sex offenders – that will offer us a better understanding of actual
nonlegal sanctions.
APPENDIX
This appendix will demonstrate in general terms the claims set out in Section II.
I use the following notation:
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Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092 (noting that “our inquiry into the law’s effects cannot consider the possible
‘vigilante’ or illegal responses of citizens to notification”). See also W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. 1199,
1211-12 (D.N.J., 1996) (noting that the scope of the analysis of the effects of the law is limited to legal
reactions of the public).
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LS = legal sanctions
NLS = nonlegal sanctions
T* = the exogenous level of total sanction set out by the political system
and assume the following continuous convex functions that represent the costs of
inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions:
CL = CL (LS), where CL>0, CL’>0, CL’’>0
CNL = CNL (NLS), where CNL>0, CNL’>0, CNL’’>0
Beginning with the benchmark case, the social optimal combination of sanctions is used
when the cost of sanctioning is minimized, thus the social planers’ problem can be
phrased as:
(1) Min: CL(LS) + CNL(NLS)
L, NL

s.t. T* = LS + NLS
which produces the following first order cond ition:
(2)

∂C L
∂C NL
=
∂LS
∂NLS

Turning to the endogenous case, this case can be represented by noting that the level of
the legal sanction is a variable within the cost function of nonlegal sanctions. The costminimizing problem will remain unchanged and can be noted as:

(4) Min: CL(LS) + CNL(NLS, LS)
L, NL

s.t. T* = LS + NLS
The first order condition of this problem is:
∂C L
∂C NL
∂C NL
(5)
+
=
∂LS
∂LS
∂NLS

∂C NL
> 0 (i.e., the substitution case) the optimal level of nonlegal
∂LS
∂C NL
sanctions will be higher than in the benchmark case, while when
< 0 (i.e. the
∂LS
signaling case) the optimal level of nonlegal sanctions will be lower than in the
benchmark case.
Note that when
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